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ABSTRACT
Cops, Consultants, and Technology: An Examination of Inno-
vation in the Boston Police Department (1962-1974)
Scott M. Hebert
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on
January 22, 1975, in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Bachelor of Science in the Department of
Urban Studies and Planning and Master of City Planning.
While a number of national commissions in this country
have recommended greater exploitation of advanced technology
as an important approach to improving police performance,
little is known about why police departments actually select
a piece of technology and how they intend to use it. Similar-
ly, there is very little information available regarding what
variables play critical roles in determining whether such tech-
nology is successfully implemented, and what the technology's
impact on departments' organization and operations has actually
been.
As an initial step toward discovering answers to these
questions and developing an understanding of the process of
technological innovation in police departments, this study
examines the introduction of a computer-aided command and
control system (CCS), similar to the type recommended by the
1967 President's Crime Commission, into one police agency,
the Boston Police Department. Information for the case study
was obtained from the Boston Police Department's files on its
technological development program, from reports of the Depart-
ment's consultants, and from a series of semi-structured in-
terviews with direct participants in the CCS project and other
affected parties. In the course of the research, the possible
role which the Department's limited technical expertise and
its reliance on consulting assistance might have had on the
process of adopting the technology was explored. Other
"variables" which were given particular attention include
the existance of external funding, the local political environ-
ment, the technology's endorsement by professional bodies, and
the Department's prior experience with innovation.
One of the most important findings from the Boston case
study was that the process of the technology's adoption was
stochastic. Over the course of the introduction and develop-
ment of the CCS, there were significant shifts in the functions
which the Department wanted the technology to perform, and the
equipment was modified accordingly.
-2-
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A second critical contribution of the case study is
that it demonstrates the inaccuracy of the Crime Commission's
assumption that police departments would follow a rational
decision-making process in selecting the technology. In the
Boston case, the two most important considerations in the
initial decision to adopt the CCS appear to have been the
status associated with possessing a piece of "high technology",
and the availability of federal subsidization to pay for it.
In these deliberations the Department exhibited little concern
about what the technology could actually do.
Finally, the study suggests that in the case of depart-
ments which have a more substantive commitment to the techno-
logy's application than the Boston Police Department initially
exhibited, the police administration may well be more interest-
ed in the capacity of such advanced systems to increase manager-
ial control than in their direct application to the problems
of crime.
Thesis Supervisor: Suzann Thomas Buckle
Assistant Professor
Department of Urban Studies
and Planning
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: TECHNOLOGY AND THE POLICE
During the last fifty years, a number of national commis-
sions have been formed .to study the problems of law enforcement
agencies and to determine ways to improve their performance.
These commissions, which were composed of the elite of the. law
enforcement community, have consistantly advocated "professional-
ism" as the solution to the inadequacies of police service.
As part of their goal of police professionalization, the commis-
sions have repeatedly recommended greater exploitation of tech-
nology. To understand the arguments used to urge departments
to adopt technological approaches to their problems, it would
be useful to review the history of the police professionalism
movement and its most notable commissions. The commissions and
their recommendations will be summarized in the first part of
this chapter.
Examining the commission reports provides us with the law
enforcement "elite's" perception of the value of technology,
but it leaves some important questions unanswered. Most import-
ant, it is unclear whether local departments have come to share
the commissions' position regarding the purpose of such tech-
nology. The last section of this chapter will be devoted to
introducing such questions in greater detail.
Police Reform at the Turn of the Century
The history of police reform in the United States is close-
ly linked to the nineteenth century emigre population's desire
-6-
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for upward mobility, and their subsequent development of the
uniquely American political institution, the "political machine."
By the end of the century, many municipal police departments had
come under the domination of the machine. As with the other
public service agencies under their control, the machines used
the police department for building the social. and economic mobil-
ity of the ethnic groups, which were the foundations of the organ-
ization's political strength.1 Understandably, many of the
middle and upper-middle class native-born Americans found this
2
situation intolerable. Beginning in the late 1800's, these
native-born Americans began to form groups which called for the
reform of municipal government.
Reform.of the police was an especially vital issue to
these groups because of what they considered to be striking
increases in lawlessness and immorality, which they attributed
to police mismanagement and corruption. More important, how-
ever, the general lawlessness and corruption were seen as mani-
festations of competing theories of social and economic mobil-*
ity. To the reformers, "social mobility in America was essen-
tially economic, private and individual... , and that as a
result, success was ultimately a function of industry, fru-
gality, integrity, respectability, and occasional good luck."3
The machines, on the other hand, held that social mobility was
political, public, and collective. If such values were insti-
tutionalized by the machines, the native-born Americans' posi-
tions of economic, political, and moral supremacy in society
would be threatened. To prevent this situation from happening,
the reformers had to destroy the power of the machine. And to
-8-
do that, they had to break the machines' grip on the police.
From 1890 until the 1930's, then, the main impetus for
police reform came from the native-born Americans and the civic
associations and municipal research bureaus which they formed.
These groups relied heavily on a military analogy as a source
of proposals for the reorganization of the police. According
to this model, the police were a military body engaged daily
in a war on crime. Carrying this analogy further, the reform-
ers argued that police officers were "home guard soldiers" who
owed the force and their superiors the undivided loyalty which
the soldier owed the army.
However, after over thirty years of effort on the part of
the reformers to develop centralized, apolitical, crime control-
oriented police departments, few of their recommendations had
7
been widely implemented. Many citizens, because of the tradi-
tional civilian character of the American police, still dis-
agreed with the idea that the military model was the appropriate
8
basis for restructuring police departments. As a result of this
resistance, the police administrators, who from 1900 through the
first World War had accepted the military analogy in increasing
numbers, began to have second thoughts about its value as a
reform strategy. Without the support of these individuals, the
9
reform movement lost much of its momentum.
The Wickersham Commission: The Beginnings of Police Professional-
ism
It was not long, however, before the police once again
-9-
became the focus of considerable public criticism and demands
for reform. Following World War I, the country began experi-
encing alarming increases in crime rates. Finally, in 1931,
when the crime rates were reaching new highs and public confi-
dence in the police had all but disappeared, the National
10
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement was formed.
The report of the "Wickersham Commission," as it was
more popularly known, was significant in three ways. First,
the report demonstrated that the police administrators them-
selves were attempting to assume the -leadership role in the
movement for police reform, which to that point had been domi-
nated by the civilian reform groups. It is significant that
the Commission's volume on the police was largely the product
of August Volmer, a reknowned police chief, and his assistants.
Second, in the discussions and recommendations of the
Commission report, the military analogy had been replaced with
a corporate/professional model. Instead of looking to the
army for ideas on how to improve the performance of the police,
the reformers now suggested that departments evaluate their
organization and practice against the operations and principles
of large-scale, "professionally run" businesses.12
Finally, and most important from the standpoint of this
study, the Commission argued that if the police were to success-
fully cope with the increasingly sophisticated crime which the
cities were experiencing, local departments would have to make
full use of the latest technological breakthroughs.
-10-
The Inefficiency of Police Administration
Many of the criticisms and recommendations contained in
the police volume of the Commission report were very similar
to those that had been advanced by the civic groups for years.
For instance, the Wickersham Commission argued that the police's
inability to prevent crime was largely attributable to police
mismanagement. This "inefficiency of police administration,"
as the report viewed it, was seen as being the result of a
variety of factors. Foremost among these in the Commission's
opinion was the poor quality of leadership and the influence of
13
politicians. Consequently, as previous investigations of the
police had done, the Commission recommended that more of an
effort be made to find competent chiefs, and that the position
of chiefs should be made more secure by extending their tenure.
The Commission also concluded that the patrolman was burdened
with too many duties and, as a result, the police function
should be narrowed to the more manageable law enforcement
tasks.
While their comments regarding police leadership and the
focus of police work were essentially identical with the pro-
posals of the progressive civic associations, the Commission's
evaluation of the quality of patrol personnel differed signifi-
14
cantly from the view held by the majority of civilian reformers.
The latter groups had felt most police officers had the basic
abilities and honesty required to function effectively once the
influence of the machine was curtailed. Instead of this view
of the patrolman as the victim of the political organizations,
-11-
the Commission held that most officers were willing and even
eager participants in the machine's illegal operations, and
concluded that, except for rare exceptions, the beat officer
was essentially incompetent, inefficient, and dishonest. As
a result, the Commission placed a great deal of emphasis on
upgrading the quality of recruits and supervisory (command and
control) staff. Not surprisingly, technology became one ob-
vious vehicle for this reform.
The Need to Exploit Technology
A major way in which the Wickersham Report differed from
earlier investigations was in regard to the attention paid to
technology. Consistant with its view of the inadequacies of
command and patrol personnel, the Commission's report criticized
the police's underutilization of existing technology as one of
the "great defects of our police administration.' The report
drew a graphic picture of the emergence of the "professional"
criminal, and the police's lack of the proper tools and train-
ing to meet the challenge which these individuals represented:
The police have now most often to deal with
highly organized groups of criminals, often
astutely led by unseen leaders, who place
at their disposal the most recent inventions
and resources in the arts and sciences which
can be effectively misapplied to criminal
ends...,.By imitating modern business in its
adoption of every mechanical contrivance
which will save labor and secure profitable
results with the least expenditure of time
and money, the criminals have by association
and combination amongst themselves become
in their commission of crime superior to the
police in detecting, arresting, and prosecut-
ing them. (emphasis added) 16
The report concluded that to "serve the community effect-
ively, the policeman should be fully equipped with the tools
of his profession" (emphasis added), and that the tools of the
law enforcement community "for the detection, pursuit, and
arrest of the criminal should be better than the equipment of
"17
the criminal. Among the technical aids which the report speci-
fically mentioned as essential for the operations of the modern
patrol force were patrol cars, wireless radio, and telephone
communication systems. In its report, the Commission also
noted that as police operations became more complex, they
would necessarily become much more dependent on records.
Accordingly, the Commission urged that departments make a great-
er effort to develop and maintain a comprehensive records
18
system.
The 1967 President's Crime Commission
Since the release of its report, the Wickersham Commission's
concept of reform has dominated much of the professionalists
thinking about the police. From the 1930's to the present, the
model of the ideal municipal police agency presented in the-
professional literature has been characterized by a strong
command and control structure, the insulation of beat officers
from political influence, an emphasis or aggressive law enforce-
ment, efficiency, and impartiality, and the use of the latest
technology.
The 1967 President's Crime Commission report, The Challenge
of Crime in a Free Society, was no exception to this pattern.
-12-
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Like the Wickersham Commission, the President's Crime Commission
was established in a period when public ,confidence in law
enforcement agencies and other governmental institutions was
19low. Crime rates had climbed steadily since the beginning
of the decade. Social unrest was also on the rise. Most im-
portant, the actions taken by the police to deal with these
problems were perceived by many quarters to be ineffective, in-
efficient, or inequitable.
The President's Crime Commission responded to the criti-
cisms which were then focused on the law enforcement community
by once again appealing to the departments to "professionalize."
In their report, professionalization became much more closely
20
linked with achieving centralized control of patrol units.
The Crime Commission denounced the "diffusion of authority,
confused responsibility, and lack of strong lines of direction
and control" which characterized many of the departments which
21
the Commission's staff had surveyed. Proper organization and
management, the Commission argued, was prerequisite for im-
plementation of most of the other recommendations contained
22
in their report. In explaining this position, the Commission
described the importance of strong centralized control in pre-
venting improper political interference, corruption, and parti-
cularistic enforcement:
For police organization, as for large scale
organization of any kind, the heart of the
matter in central control... Administra-
tively it implies policymaking and plan-
making, and the kind of supervision that
guarantees that policies and plans are under-
stood and carried out by every member of the
-14-
department....Overall, it implies the
maintenance of departmental integrity
by providing that governmental control
over the department is exercised only
by top-level political executives through
top level enforcement officials, and not
by neighborhood politicians through pre-
cinct officials.... The removal of poli-
tical pressures from subordinate police
officials would make discriminatory law
enforcement more difficult. 23
While it is not obvious from this excerpt, the Crime Commission
was especially concerned with the issue of control over the
discretion of patrolmen because of the charges of police mis-
conduct which had been raised by increasingly powerful and
militant minority groups. In fact, the entire Commission re-
port demonstrated a concern for police-community relations
which was atypical of the professionalism literature to that
point.2
Although it devoted considerable attention to the issue
of community relations, the real focus of the Commission' s re-
marks was on the methods whereby local police departments could
25
deal more effectively and efficiently with crime. Both the'
Wickersham Commission and the earlier progressive reformers
had expressed the belief that the police could eradicate most
crime, and that the only reason why they had not been effective
in this function previously was because of police mismanagement.
The President's Commission, on the other hand, was much more
open in discussing the possible social and environmental causes
of crime, which it admitted were beyond the ability of the police
to control. Nevertheless, the Crime Commission maintained that
though the .police could not prevent all crime, they could con-
-15-
trol a significant enough amount to warrant the law enforcement
function remaining the police's primary function.
The Crime Commission's View of Technology
According to the literature advocating professionaliza-
tion of the police, the police primarily prevent crime through
deterrence. A deterrant effect is achieved, the argument goes,
when the probability of apprehension is high enough to create
too great a risk for a would-be offender to be willing to
commit a crime. This view assumes a.-great deal, including the
supposition that the criminal operates in a rational enough
fashion that he will calculate realistic arrest probabilities
before undertaking any action. Nonetheless, although until
quite recently, there has been little empirical evidence re-
garding deterrence, for decades law enforcement tactics have
been based on the assumption that this phenomena actually
exists.
Once one accepts the deterrence argument, the problem of
crime control becomes a technical one. That is, how does the
department best deploy and utilize its resources so as to create
the maximum possible apprehension probability? Given this re-
formulation of the crime control problem, it is not at all sur-
prising that the professionalists in the police community, in-
cluding the President's Crime Commission, have repeatedly ad-
vocated technology.
As the Wickersham Commission had, the 1967 Crime Ccmmission
Report focused on the gross underutilization of technology by the
-16-
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criminal justice system. However, whereas the earlier study
had limited its recommendations to the acquisition of existing
devices and the provision of some technical training for career
officers, the 1967 President's Crime Commission additionally
encouraged the larger departments to establish operations re-
search groups which would be made up of professionally trained
scientists, mathematicians, and engineers. Once such a group
was formed, it would develop on-going studies of the organiza-
tion of the department, provide technical guidance to the de-
partment management, analyze operations, and assess the effects
27
of all experimentation within the department. The Commission
pointed to the "marvelous results" which such groups had
achieved in the military, federal government, and industrial
sectors, and expressed confidence that they could prove to be
a significant force for experimentation and innovation in the
28
criminal justice system.
As an introduction to the utility of the skills which the
scientists and engineers would bring to a department, the staff
of the Commission's Task Force on Science and Technology pre-
pared an example of the use of systems analysis (an operations
research technique) in finding how the patrol force could better
29
deter crime. Their analysis started with the assumption that
the principal objective of the criminal justice system was to
reduce crime. The police attempt to reduce crime, the staff
reasoned, by using the patrol force to pose a threat of appre-
hension. A preliminary study was then carried out in Los
Angeles, which suggested that apprehension probability was
-17-
correlated with response time and that a rough cost-effective-
ness analysis of a number of options for reducing response
time could be computed. The results of this analysis led to
the conclusion that the best allocation of resources would be
in automating the communications center by such means as using
computers to perform some of the dispatching functions, auto-
matic car locators to find the nearest car, and other tech-
nological possibilities.
Consistent with this analysis, in their presentation of
promising advanced "hardware," the Task Force on Science and
Technology concentrated on electronic data processing and
30
"command and control" equipment. In discussing the advantage
of computer-based information systems, reference was again made
to the success which government and industry had realized from
such equipment. The Crime Commission also made mention of the
criminal justice computerized information systems already in
existance (such as the statewide systems of California and
New York). Such computer systems, the Commission noted, could
aid the police in many capacities. For instance, they could
be used to provide real-time responses to inquiries from the
patrol force regarding outstanding warrants or stolen vehicles.
They would also permit the development of a dynamic resource
allocation capability, allowing a department to alter deploy-
ment in response to changing patterns of crimes on an hourly
or daily basis. Additionally, computer equipment could be used
to collect uniform statistics on agency operations and workloads,
which would provide a basis for estimating personnel needs and
-18-
for optimiese allocation of men and dollars.
In its "hardware" discussion, the Commission also presented
the general outlines of a possible computer-assisted command
and control system. According to the report, a properly applied
computer in such a system could reduce communications center
response time delay significantly -- from 90 seconds to about
30 seconds. Moreover, the Commission argued that with such a
computer-assisted system, many new possibilities are presented
for the deployment of patrol personnel. For instance, under a
riot or other emergency situation, contingency plans could be
programmed so that the appropriate units are sent to the emer-
gency, and adequate backup maintained.
The Commission recognized that much of the equipment which
they had recommended was relatively expensive. In fact, the
report cited the costs of such hardware as the princip al reason
why police agencies had been so slow in introducing technology
31into their operations. To help alleviate this problem, and to
promote experimentation within the criminal justice system,
the Commission asked the federal government to sponsor a national
program of research.
The United States Congress had already taken a step in this
direction when it established the Office of Law Enforcement
Assistance in the summer of 1965. Subsequent to the release
of the Crime Commission's report, the Congress passed the 1968
Omnibus Crime Control Bill, which abolished the OLEA and
created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in its
-19-
stead. Under the LEAA, the OLEA's program of grants to local.
law enforcement agencies was greatly expanded. However, the
LEAA retained its predecessor' s interest in seekingthe exploi-
tation of technology by the police, and its grant programs were
structured to provide substantial advantages to those depart-
ments who sought federal assistance for the acquisition of
32
advanced hardware.
The Diffusion of Innovation
As the preceding discussion has suggested, a considerable
amount of space in the police professionalism literature has
been devoted to advocating technology. However, surprisingly
little information is available regarding the actual process
whereby such technology gets introduced into a department's
33
operations. Specifically, there is little data in the litera-
ture about why departments decide to select a particular piece
of technology, how they use it (or plan to use it), and how
various groups in the department react to the adoption of such
technology. These questions focus on the diffusion of innovation.
The dearth of information regarding such questions appears
to be a result of some of the assumptions which professional-
ists like the President's Crime Commission made regarding
police organization and the process of diffusion. As we have
noted previously, most of the recommendations of the Crime
Commission were predicated on the assumption that a depart-
ment had first reorganized itself into a system of strong,
-20-
centralized control (similar to Weber's "monocratic" bureau-
cracy).34 According to this model of organization, an order
issued by the top police executive is faithfully enforced
down through the departmental hierarchy.
In large part because it looked upon departmental organi-
zation in this fashion, the Crime Commission subscribed to a
variation of the center-periphery theory of innovation (see
35
figure 1 ), which treats diffusion as an act of communication.
In the Commission's opinion, police administrators shared the
professional elite's deep concern for 'improving their depart-
ment's crime control performance. Therefore, essentially all
that would be required to get departmentsto introduce technology
into their operations would be for prestigious professional
bodies such as the Commission to articulate the value of tech-
nology in law enforcement, which the President's Commission
infact took great pains to do. The one factor which the
Commission saw as a possible obstacle to the technology's
diffusion was the expense of the equipment. Consequently, the
Commission sought the creation of a federally-subsidized pro-
36
gram of research which would defray some of the costs. Most
important, however, since the Commission assumed that such
professionally-minded departments would have already established
a system of centralized control, once the decision was made to
adopt the technology, implementation was not perceived as
presenting much of a problem, and was given little attention
in the report.
(Figure 1)
By viewing the technology's diffusion in this way, however,
the Commission overlooked the fact that, as in all organizations,
the staff of police agencies are attempting to achieve a
variety of personal and administrative goals in addition to
the organizational goal of crime control. Moreover, even in
the most centralized of organizations, there are often powerful
coalitions over which the top police executive has limited
control, and who consequently play a major role in determining
the nature of changes in the department. Thus, the decision
to innovate could. be prompted by a number of factors besides
the desire to improve crime prevention, and the role which
technology is assuming in law enforcement could be quite dif-
ferent from what the Crime Commission envisioned.
-21-
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As a first step towards empirically ascertaining whether
police agencies adopt and use technology in the fashion visu-
alized by the law enforcement elite, this study will examine
a case of technological innovation in the Boston Police Depart-
ment. The section which follows will detail the specific
questions which the case addresses, and will discuss the meth-
odology which was used in the search for answers to those
questions.
-23-
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CHAPTER TWO
METHODOLOGY
QUESTIONS FOR RESEARCH
The fundamental goal of this study is to begin to devel-
op an understanding of the nature of the process whereby tech-
nology is introduced into the operations of police departments.
As a case in technological innovation, an empirical investiga-
tion of the Boston Police Department's experience in adopting
a computer-aided Command and Control System was carried out.
This investigation was guided by four major questions:
1) Why does a department select a particular piece of
technology?
2) How do the selectors intend to use the technology,
and what is the expected impact?
3) Once a decision is made by a department to adopt
the technology, what variables play critical roles
in determining whether the technology -is implemented
or not?
4) What is the actual impact of the technology on the
department's organization, function, and personnel,
and on the quality of the service it provides?
Why select a particular piece of technology?
One issue which the study sought to address is how
police departments initially become aware of the existence of
a piece of technology. In the course of the research, an
-25-
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attempt was made to identify those groups whose advocacy of
sophisticated technology came to the attention of the depart-
ment, and to analyze how these groups differed in their pre-
sentation of the technology and of its potential utility to
police operations. Special consideration in this effort
was given to the motivation of these groups, how these motiva-
tions seemed to affect the character of their advocacy, and
how the department responded to the different appeals.
Another task of the research was to determine which
members of the department took part in the deliberations over
the technology's introduction, and why the decision to adopt
a technological innovation was reached. The President's
Crime Commission seemed to assume that departments would follow
a rational decision-making process, and by doing so would
discover that the advanced systems which it recommended repre-
sented a superior approach to improving police patrol perfor-
1
mance. The study of Boston' s experience was seen as a way
to test the validity of the Commission's assumptions, not only
about the nature of the decision-making process, but also in
regard to whether the primary motivation of departments for
deciding to introduce such equipment is in fact the desire to
improve patrol performance. The case also provides an oppor-
tunity to evaluate the importance of federal funding as an
incentive for police departments to adopt technological solutions
and as an influence on their perceptions of high technology.
-27-
Intended use?
Closely related to the questions of the department's
motivations for selecting technology is the issue of how the
police intend to use the technology and what the department
expects its impacts will be. The Crime Commission had antici-
pated that the police would be employing advanced systems to
improve their crime control operations. However, the equipment
which it advocated (command and control systems, automated
vehicle monitoring systems, high-speed computers) have a number
of potential functions, many of which r'elate to crime control
only indirectly. Byecamining the Boston experience, we should
be able to begin to assess how the equipment is actually per-
ceived, what (perhaps) latent goals are seen as rationales
for selecting it, and finally how perceptions of its purposes
differ among groups within the department.
What are the critical factors affecting implementation?
The Crime Commission treated the actual development and
integration of the technology into the department's operations
as relatively routine once the decision was made to adopt the
innovation. However, depending on the characteristics of the
organization and of the technology being introduced, one can
expect that departments will experience varying degrees of
success in implementing technical innovations. Some "charac-
teristics" of the technology which could prove to be importan'
determinants of success include whether the system is in a
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production state or not, or , if it requires further development,
the extent of outside subsidization which will be available.
The level of complexity and sophistication of the technology
could be another important factor, especially in regard to how
it compares with the technical ability of the department to
understand and maintain the equipment.
In addition to the technical competence of the department,
one could expect that a number of other organizational charac-
teristics could have an impact on the effort to implement
innovation. For instance, what is the environment for change
in the department like? Have there been attempts in the past
to implement similar reforms, and how have they turned out?
Have these past experiences shown the force to be receptive
to change or generally threatened by it? Does the force perceive
the technology as being relevant to its problems and consistent
with its theories of police organization and function?
Another consideration might be the internal political
environment of the department. Is there a power struggle taking
place within the command staff, or between members of the
command staff and the administration? What is the tenure and
status of those in the department who are advocating the tech-
nology? Who are the opinion leaders in the force (who must
accept the innovation if it is to succeed), and what is their
accountability to those trying to implement the technology?
Actual impact of the technology?
Probably the most important issue regarding the technology
advocated by the police professionalists is the nature of its
-29-
actual impact on the operations of police departments. If we
find that a department has adopted high technology for the
reasons recommended by the 1967 President's Crime Commission,
we must ask how the impact on patrol performance compares to
that anticipated by the Commission. If, on the other hand,
we discover that the technology has been used by the police in
ways unanticipated by the Commission, it is still very impor-
tant to ask what its impact has been ancd how it compares
to the initial expectations of the department. In either case,
it is necessary to identify the causes of the discrepancies
between the expected and actual impact, whether they be
organizational factors or limitations of the technology itself.
There is also a normative dimension to evaluating the
impact of high technology. For example, how does the cost-
effectiveness of the technological approach compare to alter-
native approaches to realizing the specific objectives of the
police? What are the potential implications of using technology-
to improve the overall quality of police service?
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE STUDY
To date, there have been few empirical investi-
gations of the process of innovation (technological or other-
wise) in police departments. Moreover, there seems to have
been almost no attempt to develop theories of police innovation
on the basis of what scant information is available. While
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the Crime Commission apparently subscribed to the center-
periphery theory of the diffusion of innovation, its selection
of this theory seemed to have been determined more by the
assumptions the Commission made about the nature and goals of
police organizations than by empirical evidence. Most impor-
tant, the theory to which the Commission subscribed primarily
focuses on the communication of innovation between organizations,
and largely overlooks the introduction of the innovation within
the organization.
The police field is not unique in the state of the
existing theory regarding organizational innovation, however.
Although considerable empirical work has been carried out
examining innovation in business organizations, little sub-
2
stantive theory has emerged from these investigations.
Consequently, it is not clear to what extent "borrowed" models
which have been developed for other types of organizations
can explain the process of innovation in police departments.
Since there is no well developed theory regarding the
process of organizational innovation, it was necessary that
3this study be essentially exploratory. As a result of this
fact, and because innovation appears to be not a single vari-
able but a complex process within which a number of critical
4
variables are likely operating, the study utilized a holistic
5
approach. That is, rather than testing pre-specified hypotheses,
the objective of the study has been to identify the more gen-
eral characteristics of the process of technological innovation
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in police departments and to identify some of the critical
6
variables which guide that process.
Because of its proximity and its history of technological
development, the Boston Police Department (BPD) served as the
focus of the research. During the period 1962-1974, the BPD
had more than a dozen federally subsidized technological projects.
However, due to time and space constraints, only one of these--
the development of a computerized command and control system-- was
examined in great detail (although the case study summarizes
the development of many of the other projects). In the next
section, the process of researching the case will be outlined.
Organization of the research
My research design for the case study involved three
major tasks: (1) compilation of available written material
on the BPD's technological programs, (2) interviews with
participants in the program, and (3) analysis of the combined
data. Initially, I. expected to be able to perform each of
these tasks independently, and in the order presented above.
However, the actual research process ended up being more of
a cyclical pattern in which I jumped back and forth between
tasks. Basically I would obtain a few reports or carry out
some interviews, and do some analysis, and then (after modifying
the focus of my inquiry on the basis of my analysis) repeat
the process over again.
One of the first concerns which I had in planning the
research on the Boston Police Department was how I might
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overcome the problem of the "blue curtain"--the legendary
unwillingness of the police to speak openly with outside
researchers. My initial assumption was that if I obtained
some "official" backing for my research from the Department
administration, than the individuals whom I was planning to
interview would be more responsive to my questions. Accord-
ingly, with the aid of some MIT faculty, I approached Mark
Furstenberg, the present director of the BPD's Research and
Planning division, with the proposal to study the Department's
technological development program. As with most of the BPD
personnel .with whom I spoke, Furstenberg indicated that he was
not particularly interested in "history" (meaning anything
focusing on the work of previous administrations) but that he
would like to see the results of the study. He did, however,
assign a patrolman to assist me in obtaining records and
arranging interviews with Department personnel. With the
patrolman's aid I was able to schedule interviews with the
following sworn personnel (for a description of the responsi-
bilities of the organizational subunits to which these officers
were assigned, see Appendix A). These individuals were selected
because they represented a variety of ranks, subunits, and
orientations in the BPD:
--the Deputy Superintendent in charge ofthe Communications
Division (who had participated in the development of
many of the technological projects)
two of the Department's five Area Commanders (both of
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whom had served as District Captains under McNamara)
--a Captain from the Bureau of Field Services (who was
responsible for developing patrol unit sectors and
equalizing workloads)
--the District Captain of District 4
--a former member of McNamara's Planning Staff
--a dozen patrolmen from Districts Four and Eleven
Working under the Department's auspices during the inter-
views turned out to have mixed results. Many of the individuals
with whom I spoke took great pains to be cooperative, and un-
doubtably would have done so even if I had not been working
through the Planning and Research Division. During several of
the conversations, however, I got the distinct impression that
I was granted an interview only because the interviewee wasn't
sure of the exact nature of my relationship with the Depart-
ment and was afraid that if I were offended, word would reach
his superiors. In such cases the answers to my questions were
unually extremely evasive.
One factor which undoutably contributed to the hesitancy
some BPD members felt about speaking with me was the fact that
I was primarily asking about events which had occured during
the previous administration of Edmund L. McNamara. Because
they did not want to lose favor with the present DiGrazia
administration (which viewed McNamara and his staff as unpro-
fessional and considered most of the pre-1973 technological
projects to be failures), members of the Department were
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hesitant to speak about the previous administration, much less
praise it. As a result, when questioned about the efforts of
the McNamara staff, the interviewees were extremely negative
or claimed ignorance, whereas when talking about the latest
reforms, the officers' comments were generally more positive
than would seem to be warranted.
In addition to my conversations with BPD personnel,
I also had access to the transcripts of interviews which Kent
Colton of MIT had in 1971 with members of the command staff
under Commissioner McNamara. These transcripts included
several interviews with Steven Rosenberg, the former Director
of Planning and Research, as well as discussions with the
Deputy Superintendent who was then in charge of Records and
Data Processing (John Bonner), and the Deputy Superintendent
then in charge of Communications Control (John West). Because
Colton had been investigating the BPD's experience in utilizing
electronic data processing equipment (such as that which formed,
the basis of the Command and Control System) the transcripts
of these discussions were very relevant to my own study, and
provided much useful information. As part of his research,
Professor Colton had also interviewed members of the staff of
Arthur D. Little and Concord Research--the consulting firms
then developing the Department's Command and Control System
and geographic base file, respectively, and these protocols
were similarly available to me.
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Colton's transcripts were supplemented by interviews
which I personally conducted with a number of the civilian
participants in the federally-funded projects.. For instance,
since Rosenberg was such a central figure in the Department's
program of technological development and had served as a special
assistant to Commissioner McNamara during the latter's second
term, I felt an additional interview of the former Planning
Director was critical. When I initially approached him,
Rosenberg asserted that since his departure from the Department,
it was normally his policy not to publically discuss the BPD.
However, because of the negative (and in his mind unfair) eval-
uation which his efforts had received in a LEAA planning agency-
sponsored review of the technological projects, he eventually
consented to present his interpretation of the projects' his-
tory for my benefit. Additional prespectives were gained from
conversations with Dr. Richard Larson and JamesWilliamson (both
of whom had functioned as consultants to the Department during
Rosenberg's association with the BPD), and with the members of the
LEAA State Planning Agency for Massachusetts.
The interviews provided valuable insights regarding
the opinions and relationships of the principal actors in the
technological projects. However, because of the subjective
character of the interviewees' comments and the confusion
which the interviewees exhibited over the exact timing of
events, for a more objective and comprehensive picture of the
history of the technological projects, I relied heavily on
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the BPD Planning and Research Division 's files (to which,
thanks to Mark Furstenberg's gracious approval, I had free
access). During the initial stages of the research, I had
been concerned about the level of documentation which might
exist on the projects, but within a short time realized my
worries had been unwarranted. In .addition to the grant appli-
cations and finAl reports for the technological projects, the
BPD's files also contained numerous progress reports detailing
the work accomplished during each stage of the technology's
development, and considerable correspondence between the fund-
ing 'sources, the BPD, and its consultant. This correspondence
was a particularly revealing source of information regarding
shifts in the nature of the relationships between actors or
in project orientation.
As the introduction to this section suggests, the basic
approach used in synthesizing an holistic assessment from the
data available to me was what Glaser and Strauss term a "constant
7
comparative" method of analysis. Essentially, my approach
involved reading the assembled case study materials over and
over again, each time noting in the margin those places where
I felt a critical decision or shift in orientation had occurred,
and hypothesizing what the causes of these "events" had been.
By repeatedly going through the data in this way, and constantly
evaluating and modifying the tentative hypotheses in light of
the different sources of data, I gradually developed an under-
standing of both the nature of the process by which the tech-
nology was introduced, and the critical variables therein.
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THE SETTING OF THE STUDY: THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
This section will briefly describe the environment into
which the McNamara administration sought to introduce high
technology. In this description, particular attention is
paid to those characteristics of the BPD's history, structure,
values, and workload which tend to distinguish it from other
urban police forces.
The Boston Police Department, the oldest in the country,
was founded in 1838, only nine years after Sir Robert Peel
established the Metropolitan Police of London as the world's
first organized police force. For its first two decades,
the Boston police was actually two separate forces, a day
force operated by a city marshal and a night force super-
vised by a chief constable. In 1854, however, the BPD was
reorganized, with the night and day forces being merged into
8
a single body.
9
According to Reppetto, the basic structure of the BPD
has changed little since the mid-nineteenth century reform
(see Appendix A), and the Department retains a strong traditional
orientation. The BPD is formally organized in the classic mold
of steep hierarchy (with six rank levels between patrolman and
commissioner) and functional compartmentalism. Moreover, the
Department is very decentralized (as in the days before mobile
patrol), with the bulk of the force assigned -to uniformed duty
in the eleven districts. Although during the last decade (and
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particularly the last few years) the power of the district
commanders has diminished considerably, they still possess a
great deal of control over field operations. The tradition
of decentralized control is not limited to the districts,
however. A considerable number of the command statf in head-
quarters itself views their subunits as largely autonomous
.10baronies.
The BPD has 2500 sworn officers, making it one of the
nation's largest departments. Most of the members of the
Department have been recruited from among local residents,
and the force contains few blacks, Puerto Ricans, women, or
college-educated personnel. Eighty-five percent of tne sworn
personnel are patrolmen, although only about 40% actually
perform field work. This situation is partially accounted
for by the fact that the BPD has the oldest personnel of any
major force in the country, with an average age of 44 years
11in 1970. The emphasis on tradition and high average age
also helps account for the force's conservative orientation
and dislike of change. The force's wariness towards suggestions
for reform was undoubtably heightened by a number of inves-
tigations of the Department carried out during the 1960's
which hinted at the existance of widespread police misconduct.12
Like most departments, the BPD experienced alarming
increases in crime rates over the decade of the sixties. For
instance, from 1962 to 1969, the number of Part I Crimes jumped
13from 20,515 to 43,347. However, unlike most other departments,
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the BPD additionally performs a variety of nonenforcement
functions (such as ambulance service, voter registration, and
license investigation), the demand for which also increased
during the last ten years. Nonetheless, though 85% of the
calls which the BPD receives are unrelated to criminal ac-
14
tivity, most of the force (and especially the younger officers)
have tended to reject a social worker orientation, preferring
instead to view themselves as law enforcement experts.1 5
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Since this study involves only a single case, there is
the problem which Weiss discusses of generalizing from "an N
of one. "16 In the holistic approach, generalization is based
on two assumptions. First, there is a presupposition that
"the study of the situation will reveal inter-relations among
elements, that the organization of these interrelations will
have the properties of a system, and that the system will be
the unifying force underlying the observed phenomena." Second,
the holistic approach assumes "that whenever the system is
repeated . . . the same interrelations must exist and phenomena
which are essentially the same . . . will be observe. "7
Although the ability to generalize rests with these two
assumptions, the accuracy and usefulness of -the generalizations
depend on the validity of the holistic assessment and the
frequency with which systems essentially identical to the
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idealized system exist elsewhere. The problem of demonstrating
the validity of a holistic assessment is a difficult one. As
- . 18Weiss points out:
. . . If one sets up falsifiability as a test for
whether a statement is a useful assertion about
reality, then holistic assessments often are unsatis-
factory. For though their assertions taken one by
one can be matched against reality, the more impor-
tant assertion that the observations are systematically
interrelated often eludes test. How, one might ask,
can one tell the difference between the careful iden-
tification of systematic interrelation which is the
product of good sociological work ana the almost
equally convincing assertion of systematic inter-
relations which is the product of .paranoid delusion?
The answer would seem to involve some process of
evaluating the weight of the eviaence, a much less
clear process than the significance testing which
is available to analytic investigation.
One of the benefits of the holistic approach is the
density of empirical detail, or evidence, which is available
to the researcher, and subsequently, to the reader. However,
even the most conscientious holistic analyst can never
entirely eliminate the possibility of bias in his or her assess-.
ment. For instance, I have been able only to present a frac-
tion of the data which I have encountered in the course of
the reseaich. Additionally, the data which I have selected
for inclusion in the presentation is that which provides the
strongest support for my particular theory of the system.
Furthermore, much of the theory of holistic analysts
is often grounded on interpretations of events, rather than
on the mere details of the events, but the distinction between
fact and interpretation is not always obvious to the reader.
In the text which follows, I have tried. to address this problem,
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and have striven to make my occasional interpretation of events
distinguishable from the bulk of the case, in which I am simply
outlining tne facts of the situation. As I have probably not
been completely successful in this regard, the reader is urged
to study the case with a critical eye.
Finally, even if the theoretical assessment ot the
Boston experience is wholly accurate, unless essentially simi-
lar systems exist elsewhere, the transferability of the findings
will be severely limited. The issue thus becomes, how repre-
sentative of police departments in general is the BPD's
organization, political environment, values, and resources
(human, material, and financial)? For example, the BPD was
undoubtably more decentralized than most police agencies, but
its hierarchical structure and compartmentaiism is characteris-
tic of a great number of departments. Moreover, the criticisms
of the BPD and pressures on it to demonstrate reform are prob-
ably not unlike those experienced by many law enforcement
bodies. On the other hand, the Boston force did have much
less of a professional ethos than is evident in some depart-
ments around the country, but is it not immediately obvious
which "style" of policing is more representative of the average
police department. Further, although the BPD is a particularly
large agency (in terms of both budget and manpower), most
departments presumably had similar access to the federal grant
program, which should tend to equalize the resources which
could be brought to bear by a department. In snort, it is
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aifficult at this point to accurately appraise the "represen-
tativeness" of the Boston Police Department. At the very
least, however, the Boston experience should provide a set of
hypotheses which will be useful to guide future investigations
of police innovation.
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CHAPTER THREE
ORGANIZATION OF THE CASE STUDY
The case study replicates the basic sequence of
events in the BPD's technological development program
between 1962 and 1974. This "longitudinal" format was
chosen for a number of reasons. From my observations,
it became clear that an awareness of the temporal re-
lationship between the emergence of external pressures
for reform and key actors was critic'al if one was to
appreciate the Department's decision to adopt the tech-
nology. Similarly, I felt that presenting the case study
in a chronological fashion would more effectively convey
the confluence of factors which brought about shifts in
the Department's orientation toward the technological
projects, and determined the potential for successful
implementation. Organizing the material in this way
seems to give the reader a better "feel" for the situa-
tion, and for the reasonableness of the author's supposi-
tions about causal relationships.
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BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT: THE ROOTS OF REFORM
The Boston Police Department: 1900-1962
At the turn of the century, the Boston Police Force was con-
sidered one of the best, most scandal-free departments in the
country. While the Department did receive some criticism for
being proportionately the largest and most expensive department
in the country, the force generally received praise from the
municipal reformers active during this period.
In 1919, however, the Patrolman's Association (which had
heretofore been primarily a social and benevolent organization
of Boston's police officers) sought to affiliate with -the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor. This activity led to the dismissal of
the Association's leadership from the force. The dismissal was
followed by a sympathy strike by over two-thirds of the patrol
force beginning on September 9th. Although the strike only
lasted a few days, the rioting which occurred in the city in
the absence of the full complement of the police force brought
sharp criticism from the public and the summary firing of all
the strikers by Governor Calvin Coolidge.
In the years following the strike the Department's administra-
tion concentrated on recruiting a new police force. However, this
new force did not attain the praise and respect which its pre-
decessor had enjoyed. In fact, from the late 1920's through 1943,
the Department was rocked by a series of scandals involving alleg-
ed corruption of police officials. 2
Although the Department had had five different commssioners
between 1922 and 1943, all of whom had left office under pres-
sure, the Commissioner appointed in 1943 remained in office
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an unprecedented 14 years until 1957, and did a great deal to
restore the Department's image of integrity. Nevertheless,
according to Reppetto, during the decade of the fifties, "the
changes in police organization and methods which were taking
place in other cities at that time left no trace in Boston."3
For instance, the Night Watch organizational pattern, which
dated from the mid-nineteenth century and divided the city into
a large number of districts, was retained despite the fact that
the district boundaries no longer reflected equal workloads or
populations.
Additionally, in 1960, the cost .for providing police ser-
vice for Boston was again revealed to be proportionally the high-
est in the country. As it had done nearly fifty years earlier,
in the weeks that followed this revelation the Department tried
to justify the high cost in terms of superior protection and
police services. The Department was especially vocal in citing
how it had cracked down on book-making and other forms of gam-
4bling in the preceding months. A year and a half after this
claim, however, the credibility of the Department's policy on
gambling was seriously impaired when NBC broadcast on national
television a film showing several men alleged to be Boston
police officers frequenting a commercial establishment which
had been raided by state and federal officers as a bookmaking
center, but which had escaped similar attention from the muni-
5
cipal force.
In the wake of this scandal, three major events occurred.
First, in 1962 and after seventy-seven years of state control
jurisdiction over the city's police was returned to municipal
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government. Shortly thereafter, Boston Mayor Collins appointed
Edmund L. McNamara, a sixteen -year veteran of the FBI, as the
new Commissioner. Also in that year, the International Asso-
ciation of Chiefs of Police completed a survey on the BPD and
recommended that a wide variety of reforms be implemented.
The 1962 IACP Report
The findings of the IACP report, which were largely assi-
milated by the city administration in its blueprint for police
reform over the ensuing decade, can be summarized by four state-
ments:
1) The BPD was too large and expensive;
2) the BPD was poorly organized and managed;
3) the BPD was poorly deployed and engaged in too many non-
police activities;
4) BPD personnel were not qualified for their duties.
1) Size and Cost: The IACP report disclosed a number
of interesting statistics comparing the BPD with other depart-
ments. For instance, in 1962 the Department had 4.26 men for
every 1,000 population, which turned out to be the highest
ratio for any American city with a population of 250,000 or
more. Additionally, per capita cost for police services in
Boston was $26.36, whereas the median for cities of 500,000
or more was only $17.26.
To reduce the size and expense of the Department (since
94% of the police budget went to salaries), the IACP recommend-
ed that the force be reduced by 600 through attrition.
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2) Organization and Management: The "Quinn Tamm" report,
as the IACP study was locally known, described the BPD as
"probably the most decentralized organization in the country"
and claimed that the department was characterized by "divided
authority, excessive spans of control, and inadequate record-
keeping." In order to make it possible for the force to
6
"operate as one department, not decentralized baronies," the
IACP recommended that the Department reduce its number of dis-
tricts from seventeen to five, to reassign the station detec-
tives to headquarters, and to organize the force according to
function. Further, the IACP urged that the Department elimi-
nate the position of a single superintendent as number two man
in the Department; this act would serve to centralize control
in the commissioner by giving him authority over both adminis-
tration and operations. The report also directed the Depart-
ment to increase the number of supervisors, to fix responsi-
bility for each man's performance, and to centralize the record-
keeping systems.
3) Functions and Allocation of Resources: The report
was highly critical of the use of patrolmen in Boston to per-
form such non-police tasks as clerical work, census taking,
licensing of taxis, and the provision of ambulance services.
Accordingly, the IACP recommended that the police function
should be narrowed considerably, and that citizens should be
hired to perform the department's clerical work, thereby free-
ing patrolmen for street assignment. They also felt the De-
partment had too many foot beats, and argued that such officers
could be much more effective in dealing with crime if assigned
to motorized patrol.
4) Personnel: The report indicated that almost all
aspects of the Department's selection, training, and method of
promotion of officers was inadequate. Among its recommendations
in this area the report urged that the .Department recruit on a
nationwide basis, seek better educated men, utilize psychologi-
cal and intelligence tests in screening recruits, and upgrade
the academy's curriculum. It also recommended that the Depart-
ment make promotions on the basis of supervisory capabilities,
rather than on the basis of seniority and the memorization of
the Blue Book.
The set of recommendations which the IACP offered to the
Department were by no means unique or surprising. In fact,
they represented the fundamental prescription for reform
which police professionalists had been advocating since the turn
7
of the century. As Reppetto has pointed out: .. . the
IACP sought to emphasize the law enforcement, crime control
mission of the police, and to create a tightly controlled, high-
ly centralized department with a well trained staff operating
under the classic merit personnel system."
The BPD's Initial Response to the IACP Survey
In 1964, Commissioner McNamara made a presentation to the
IACP conference in which he reviewed the progress of the BPD
in implementing the recommendations of the 1962 survey. The
Commissioner's presentation focused not only on the Department's
achievements in the last two years, but also on the local ob-
stacles which could hinder further implementation of the sug-
gested reforms.
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McNamara prefaced his comments to the conference by noting
that as in all studies of this type, the Boston Survey had con-
centrated only on the weaknesses of the BPD, and therefore to
the layman, its final report appeared to be "unduly critical."
McNamara continued, however, (and thus softened what appeared
to be a thinly veiled criticism of the study) by recognizing
the validity of the IACP's suggestions for reform:
A more detailed study of the report, however,
demonstrates that their recommendations con-
form to those generally recognized and accepted
as standard practices and procedures by every
modern progressive police agency.... 8
His next few sentences, nevertlieless, expressed serious
reservations about the ability, at least in the short term, to
implement many of the survey's recommendations in the BPD:
.... If it were my responsibility to organize a
new police department in a new city, not affected
by legislative restrictions and deep-rooted cus-
toms, I would readily accept practically all of
the general recommendations made in the report.
This is not an easy task, however, in an old city
like Boston which is steeped in the traditions
and customs of more than three centuries. 9
Despite this disclaimer, it appeared that in the previous
two years a number of significant actions had been taken along
the lines suggested by the survey. One of the first things
which McNamara did upon becoming Commissioner was to form a
Planning Board (made up of career department officers), and to
assign the Board's members "to study, evaluate and report on
every phase of the completed survey."
Two decisions resulted from these deliberations:
1) a decision was made to create a new organizational
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structure for the BPD; and,
2) a decision was made to select those survey recommenda-
tions which McNamara, his administrative assistants, and
the Planning Board considered to be of primary importance
and within the departmental administration's ability to
implement.
10
The reorganization, which became effective on January 3,
1963, was principally concerned with the consolidation of the
departmental agencies into four bureaus, each headed by a super-
intendent who reported directly to the Commissioner. (See
Appendix A.).
There are several aspects of the reorganization which
deserve special note, however. For one thing, under the new
organization plan, the inspectional function was expanded con-
siderably to full bureau (line) status. This move represented
the elimination of several layers of management between the
Commissioner and those personnel who were charged with moni-
toring departmental activities to assure compliance with formal
policies.
Another feature of the reorganization was the addition of the
Planning Division to the Department's organizational struc-
ture. Among the duties vested with this division was respon-
sibility for the development of plans and procedures for all
phases of departmental operations, operation of the new Data
Processing section , and the preparation of the Department
budget. These responsibilities, along with this unit's promi-
nent position in the Office of the Commissioner and McNamara' s
emphasis on planning in his IACP presentation, seemed to suggest
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that this division would be a relatively powerful one in the
new bureaucracy.
The reorganization was not wholly successful at stream-
lining and rationalizing the Department's structure, however.
In the new Department organization, the dispatchers, who have
responsibility for a large amount of the deployment of cars
(in response to calls for service), were placed under the juris-
diction of the Records and Communication division within the
Bureau of General Services. Since it was the Bureau of Field
Operations, rather than the Bureau of General Services, which was
charged with maintaining and coordinating the patrol force,
the placement of the dispatchers under the latter bureau
served to complicate the lines of authority regarding control
of the field force.
Another subject which McNamara discussed in his 1964
presentation was the consolidation of the Boston Police De-
partment's stationhouses. This area was one in which the
Commissioner was able to report some progress. McNamara re-
vealed that even before the submission of the Boston Survey
Report to the Department, one of the station houses had already
been vacated, which had resulted in an estimated annual savings
of over $200,000.00. In addition, plans were being formulated,
with the assistance of the Boston Redevelopment Agency (the
local urban renewal agency), for the consolidation and/or re-
placement of the remaining stations.
In his address, McNamara also observed that a large por-
tion of the Boston Survey had concentrated on the weaknesses
and deficiencies of the BPD's record management system. In
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response to this criticism, McNamara reported that the Depart-
ment was making progress in the records area, and, with the assis-
tance of two private business organizations that volunteered
their technical assistance, was in the process of planning "the
development of a model police central records system which
will represent the best available in the law enforcement field.
The Commissioner's remarks were much less optimistic,
however, in regard to the possibilities for reducing the size
of the force and narrowing the functions performed by the
Boston police. From his comments on the importance of guarding
against the dilution of the patrol force, it appears that
McNamara had not agreed with the recommendation of the Boston
Survey to reduce the force by 640 officers. Moreover, he noted
that this reduction had been predicated on the "drastic consoli-
dation of the station houses" as well as "the dropping of the
licensing functions, ambulance service, and other non-police
activities."1 2 Although McNamara himself argued that the primary
mission of the police was crime repression, he indicated that
community resistance to many of the IACP's recommendations had
become evident, and in some instances has been converted into
13
a "ready-made political issue. " He continued:
A study of our day-to-day operation reveals that
our police department is essentially a service organi-
zation ...Over the years the citizens of Boston
have come to expect assistance from the police
in areas far removed from what are considered
normal police responsibilities...
Out-of-town experts in the field of police admini-
stration may rightfully stress their professional
concept that the police image is best served when
their functions are strictly confined within the
framework of actual law enforcement, and we quite
agree with this premise. In practice, however, it
-55-
is very difficult to abruptly reverse the
policies of police service which have become
a traditional way of life with the local in-
habitants.... (Consequently, McNamara warned
that) progress in this area will be slow due to
the necessity for legislative action and also
the desire to be responsive to the will of the
people. 14
The Commissioner's remarks to the conference seem to be
significant in a number of ways. Although he did not agree
with all of the Survey's recommendations (such as the recommen-
dation to increase specialization in the Department and to re-
duce the size of the force), it appears that McNamara felt con-
siderable pressure to demonstrate at least a token attempt to
accomplish reforms in all the areas outlined in the 1962 re-
port. The status of the Department (and its leadership) with-
in the police community was at stake, Accordingly, McNamara
went out of his way to repeatedly emphasize that progress on
many of the Department's projects was achieved even before
15
the IACP survey was completed. In addition, McNamara predicted
that with the completion of a number of the projects underway,
the BPD would become the leader in the law enforcement field in
these aspects of police operations.
By 1964, however, McNamara had already encountered some
serious local opposition to the implementation of several of
the IACP's major recommendations. Citizens and businesses
who feared that the closing down of the local station house
would mean a decline in the quality of police service, pro-
tested the consolidation of districts. Similarly the pro-
posal to reduce the patrol force drew sharp criticism from
local groups. Moreover, because the low pay scale of the
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policemen made them the cheapest available source of labor for
performing municipal duties such as census taking and licensing,
the city administration indicated it would oppose any attempts
to eliminate BPD responsibility for such functions.16
Although some of this opposition might have coincided
with McNamara's personal biases, it also threatened to frus-
trate his efforts in many of those areas where he had agreed
with the survey's recommendations, such as removing respon-
sibility for non-police functions. If McNamara wanted to pro-
duce some concrete reforms to demonstrate to the IACP that the
BPD was moving forward on its recommen'dations he would have to
concentrate his efforts on a less controversial area.
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ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC. AND THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT:
PLANNING FOR AN INTEGRATED INFORMATION SYSTEM
The BPD's Records and Reporting System
One facet of the BPD's operations which needed substan-
tial improvement, but, unlike consolidation,had not resulted
in wide-spread opposition, was the area of records and reports.
The existing BPD records system had evolved slowly over time
17
without very much attention to its overall design. Each time
somebody had wanted to collect a new piece of information, the
response of the records section had been to design an additional
form. As a result, the Department had literally hundreds of
different forms, many of which contained largely redundant in-
formation. Filling out all the proper forms for an incident
was an arduous and time-consuming task for the patrolmen.
Moreover, the data from these reports was all compiled by hand
by clerks at the stations and headquarters, which increased
the chance of error.
This system of record-keeping was so inadequate, in fact,
that in 1958 the F.B.I. had refused to accept the accuracy of
18
the Department's crime statistics. In response to this criticism,
the Department switched from compiling statistics by hand to the
use of unit record equipment. The purchase of more sophistica-
ted data processing equipment was suggested to the Department
at that time by several computer vendors, but the Commissioner,
who we've already indicated had done much to restore the in-
tegrity of the Department, felt that such equipment was not
19
necessary.
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In 1962, with the advent of the McNamara administration
and the IACP Report, the-Department was again approached by
vendors. This time, however, the vendors' efforts were re-
warded. By 1964, McNamara had signed a letter of intent with
IBM (for the lease of a 360 Model 30 computer with 32k bytes of
core memory) which the Department's Data Processing Advisory
Committee subsequently approved.
While McNamara may have privately viewed this action largely
as an easy way to obtain a visible symbol of reform, in the report
which the Planning Division prepared (with the help of the con-
sultant firm, J. R. Reilly & Co.) as justification for leasing the
computer, the money-saving aspects of electronic data processing
equipment were stressed. In particular, the Department indicated
that it envisioned using the computer in connection with pay-
roll preparation, inventory and budget control, and fleet
maintenance control. The report also indicated that the computer,
by providing the potential for timely analysis of crime trends,
and fuller, easier access to information, would likely result
in more effective performance by the Department. The report
must have been fairly persuasive, for although there was some
doubt on the part of the City Council regarding what this action
meant in terms of helping to solve crime, in 1965 the Depart-
ment received city approval for the leasing of the computer.2 0
The Boston Police Department's efforts to implement a new
record and reporting system were facilitated by the establish-
ment of the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance in the summer
of 1965. As the federal government's response to the rising
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crime rates in the first half of the decade, the OLEA was
empowered to distribute grants to encourage comprehensive
planning by the states, and experimentation in innovative
approaches to crime control by local law enforcement agencies.
One avenue which the federal government was particularly
interested in exploring was the use .of technology in combatting
crime.
By the fall of 1966, the OLEA had set up a regional office
for Boston. At that time, the Boston Police Department was
expecting delivery of their IBM 360/30 within the year. In
October, representatives of the Department met with Dr. Robert
Emrich of the OLEA to discuss whether and how the agency could
help the BPD in developing its records and reporting system.
As a result of this meeting, an agreement was reached that the
Boston Police Department would request a grant to study the
Boston reporting system and to devise a design for an integrated
information system. A key objective of this study would be
"to determine the most efficient method and means for acquiring,
storing, retrieving, and disseminating information" 21 of use
to the Department.
For technical assistance in this study. Dr. Emrich suggest-
ed that the Department get in touch with Professor Alvin Drake
at MIT. Representatives from the Department's administration
subsequently met with Professor Drake, an expert in Operations
Research, who volunteered the services of ,two of his students,
Steven Rosenberg and Richard Larson, both candidates for
Master's Degree in Operations Research. Larson and
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Rosenberg were to provide the Department with some preliminary
assistance in its study, but as the students could not be much
assistance in determining the economic feasibility of various
information system options, Drake suggested the Department
contact the Cambridge, Massachusetts consulting firm of Arthur
D. Little, Inc. (ADL) .
ADL: The San Francisco Experience
When the BPD first approached the local office, Arthur
D. Little, Inc. had branches located in a number of cities
throughout the United States, including one in San Francisco.
Until the early sixties the San Francisco office, like its
Cambridge counterpart, had been primarily concerned with the
physical sciences. In 1961, however, the San Francisco office
was reorganized in an attempt to expand ADL's operations into
22
the social sciences. Shortly thereafter the consultant secured
a contract to use systems analysis in developing a community
renewal plan for the City of San Francisco, and ADL ventured
into the field of urban problems for the first time. We shall
briefly examine ADL's experience in this effort. There are two
reasons for this: first, ADL became engaged by the BPD almost
immediately after the termination of the San Francisco contract,
so one could expect their West Coast experience would have a
significant effect on their manner of operation in Boston; and
second, a number of the problems which ADL encountered in San
Francisco were also evident in their work in Boston.
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About a year before the West Coast branch realligned, the
local urban renewal coordinator initiated informal discussions
with a friend on ADL staff about ways to launch San Francisco's
23
Community Renewal Program (CRP). These discussions princi-
pally focused on the feasibility of using sophisticated systems
analysis and data processing to develop the general renewal
plan. As ADL's representative soon discovered, the City Plan-
ning department, the body actually charged with developing the
community renewal plan, was particularly receptive to the idea
of utilizing a systems approach to the CRP. A few years ear-
lier , while trying to select computer equipment, many members
of the City Planning Staff had been extremely impressed by a
management information system report that had been prepared
for Los Angeles. One of the agency research planners had been
so impressed that he began "advancing a systems-oriented CRP...
a decision-making system based upon a management information
system. "
Eventually ADL submitted a proposal to do the Community
Renewal Plan for the city. A key element of the firm's pro-
posed approach was the development of a large scale computer
simulation. The operational simulation would be used in the
following way:
Based on the model, urban development trends and
future renewal requirements will be forecast.
The model will be used to run a series of special
tests designed to determine and measure the effects
of introducing changes in the model by altering
one or more elements in the existing system.
The factors in the model will be changed to test
different assumptions, conditions, policies, and
their consequences. The consequences of different
renewal programs, priorities and time schedules
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will be analyzed and tested against the financial,
relocation, administration, and other resources... 25
This analysis would then be used to draw up the actual re-
newal plan.
The city approved the firm's proposal, and in February,
1963, a third party contract was entered for $520,000 between
the Department of City Planning and ADL. The final
report from the project was expected in April of 1965. In the
months which followed the agreement, ADL experienced a number
of difficulties which impaired its ability to meet the terms
of the contract. These difficulties resulted from the lack of
staff expertise in the particular areas of investigation, the
lack of sufficient data, and the lack of prior comparable
efforts to use as guidelines for the model's development. As
we shall see, similar deficiencies were to hinder the consul-
tant's operations in Boston.
The firm's initial problems in San Francisco came when the
ADL planner most responsible for the early negotiations and the
proposal withdrew from the project to accept a faculty appoint-
ment, only three months after the contract was signed.26
The planner which ADL hired as 'his replacement, as well as the
majority of the ADL project staff, had little familiarity with
computer modeling, and nothing near the technical skills re-
27quired to develop the simulation. Even if they had had the
technical abilities, the staffs' efforts would have been hind-
ered by the lack of accessibility to the client. Since the
city contributed so little money to the project (the majority
of funds coming from the federal Housing and Home Finance Agency),
they felt little incentive to commit city manpower to closely
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monitor and participate in the design of the model. It was
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considered the experts' job. What the city didn't seem to real-
ize however, was unless it was careful to outline its require-
ments, the final design of the model would probably not respond
to its needs. ADL ran into additional problems. Despite a
survey of city information sources the consultants were unable
to discover any reliable and consistant data sets which would
be suitable for model construction and testing. The informa-
tion which did exist in the Assessor's Office and Board of
Education was denied the firm on the basis of what was termed
"political reasons. 29As a result of this development, the
industrial and commercial sections of the model were dropped.
From the ambitious plans at the start of the project to de-
velop an analytical tool which could examine all aspects of
the economic, physical, and political environment, the scope
of the proposed simulation was redefined as being limited to
the residential housing sector.
ADL was able to finally come up with an initial version
of the model in December 1964, and a second, more complicated
version in the summer of 1965, but its effort never really
overcame the initial personnel and information problems. More-
over, as a result of the lack of similar modelling efforts,
and the scarcity of reliable theory on housing market behavior,
the simulation ended up containing a number of highly question-
30
able simplifications and assumptions. There was also strong
reason to believe that the demographic estimates upon which
the model was based were probably erroneous. To compound this,
the results of the model were expressed in a geographic unit
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(a "fract") which had no counterpart in reality and was useless
31
to the city planning authorities.
In the agreement with the city, the simulation had been
seen as a means to an end, the community renewal plan. None-
theless, throughout most of the contract, ADL, which was pro-
fessionally committed to exploring the utility of systems anal-
ysis to public sector problems, had operated as if the simu-
lation were their principal objective. In fact, the model
functioned as an unintended retardant to the development of
the renewal plan. According to Brewer, "the model's novelty--
its sex appeal -- took a disproportionate amount" of time and
attention of the project staff (as opposed to that expended on
the larger goal of the plan itself) "because it was of great
32
intellectual interest to the people on board the staff." It
also had a similar "sedative" effect on the city planning
people:
Everybody talked about things in terms of the model...
the model was the catchword. If you talked
about changing the administration of the city...
about changing zoning regulations....a great many
decisions that had to be made in the course of
time were deferred because of the possible
development of the model. 33
ADL's fixation with the simulation could not last forever,
since their contract called for submission of the Community
Renewal Plan in mid-1965. Below is one project participant's
description on how the CRP was eventually put. together:
ADL management had agreed to present its recomend-
ations as a public service on local television in
June 1965. The problem was that "there had to be a
report so that there would be something to talk about."
Recollections vary, but sometime around four to six
months before the project was over, panic set in:
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"There (had to) be something to talk about,
according to the project leader (planner), who
assembled a separate team, but"no OR guys as
such. We went into a room, and I said, 'We are not
going to leave this room until we walk this thing
through'...The recommended CRP was produced in this
fashion." This fashion meant "sitting down with
the census books (and) .. .plotting enumeration dis-
trict information... (because) we really at that
stage didn't even know where the housing con-
ditions were pretty bad." It meant occasionally
leaving the room (the process took about two
months)" to go out to do the quickest and dirti-
est windshield surveys to confirm the 160 Census
data." It meant that ADL at the last moment "flew
some writers out from Cambridge...to polish (the
report) up. It was kind of a round-the-clock
operation such that one of the guys who flew out...
died of a heart attack about a week later. It
was really that bad.' And it meant finding out
"that it (the CRP) could have been done...without
going through the agency of the model..." 34
ADL's first effort in applying sophisticated analysis and
technology to urban problems was by m9st assessments a failure.
Partly this result had been due to the restrictions of the
contract timetable, but even with more time it is not clear
whether the firm could have done very much better given the
relatively limited resources and expertise it was devoting to
the project, and the dearth of similar efforts which could pro--
vide some guidance.
ADL and BPD: OLEA Grant #153 Application
At the conclusion of the San Francisco Project, Dr. Martin
Ernst, one of the three members of the project staff with OR
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training, relocated to the Cambrdige office of ADL. A short
time after Ernst's transfer, ADL was approached by the Boston
Police Department regarding the possibility that the firm could
assist the Department in its effort to revise the reporting
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and records syste, On Decexmber 16, 1966, Dr. Ernst, along
with Dr. Steven Waldron, another member of the ADL staff, met
with representatives of the BPD. In the BPD contingent was Super-
intendent William A. Taylor, then in charge of the Bureau of Gen-
eral Services. Taylor was joined by Supt. John T. Howland, who
had served as Administrative Assistant to the Commissioner during
the 1962 reorganization, and was, at the time of the meeting, head
of the Bureau of Inspectional Services and Chairman of the BPD's
Advisory Board. The remainder of the BPD group was made up of two
patrolmen from the Department's Planning Division, 6and Richard
Larson, one of the graduate students suggested to the BPD by
Professor Drake of M.I.T.
The composition of the BPD contingent is noteworthy in several
respects. For one thing, although the Department was negotiating
a significant development project, and in one of the areas singled
out by the International-Association of Chiefs of Police as need-
ing reform, for the most part McNamara did not involve himself
directly in the process. According to a number of sources, by the
end of his first term McNamara had become disillusioned with the
possibility of reforming the Department, and had begun to dele-
37gate more and more authority for such efforts to his subordinates,
and especially to Howland.
The BPD group was also very unrepresentative of the Depart-
ment as a whole. For instance, there were no representative
from either the Bureau of Field Operations or the districts.
Further, of the two senior command staff officers present,
Howland, who seemed to have an atypical commitment to
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the Department's reform, apparently dominated.the negotiations.
The Department's delegation also included a civilian academician/
practitioner, Richard Larson, who had the same professional
interests as ADL had in advocating the application of sophis-
ticated Operations Research techniques and technology.
Finally, as we shall see, the group which gathered for the
December 16th meeting was also significant because over the
duration of the Department's relationship with ADL, very few
additional BPD personnel would become directly involved in the
projects on which the consultant worked.
At the December meeting, possibly as a result of the
availability of OLEA funds, it was agreed that developing an
integrated information and communications system for the De-
partment would involve at least two stages. First, ADL would
develop a plan for establishing the system. For this task,
Ernst suggested the department should apply for a federal
grant of $30,000. For doing the actual implementation, Ernst
indicated that a second grant would be required, on the order
of $90,000. This arrangement seemed acceptable to the BPD
representatives, who stressed, however, that the end result
"should show some benefit to other police departments in the
country."3 8 The BPD seemed concerned not only with getting
an improved information system, but one which would be inno-
vative enough to increase the Department's status in the police
community.
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It is noteworthy that little further discussion between ADL
and the BPD preceded the submission of the OLEA grant appli-
cation the following month. Aside from a vist to Police Head-
quarters by Waldron (who was to serve as the project leader of
the ADL staff) in late December 1966, primarily for the purpose
of picking up the OLEA applications forms and names of the BPD
personnel participating in the project, the Department and con-
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sultants did not meet again formally until January 9th. The
ADL and BPD representatives were joined in this meeting by Dr.
Emrich, the Regional Director of the OLEA. The proposal was
found to be acceptable to all the parties present, and, after a
few days delay to get the necessary signatures, the application
was officially submitted.
What was of concern to ADL and the BPD at this time is re-
flected in this initial grant application. In the application,
in a fashion very similar to that which ADL had employed in its
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San Francisco proposal, the consultant outlined its perceptions
of the BPD's problems, developed a set of study objectives which
it felt followed from these problems, and presented the research
methodology by which these objectives would be achieved. Since
the Department gave its approval to this application, one can
conclude that it also gave a reasonable impression of .the BPD
administration's perceptions of the current status of the De-
partment (or at least the image of the Department which the
administration wanted to project).
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The ADL application stressed several points:
1) it claimed that the Department had performed
much better than the BPD's critics would concede;
2) the application admitted,. nonetheless, that the
Department's operations could be improved in a
number of areas;
3) however, to be in a position to determine what
changes were really necessary, and to measure the
effect of such changes once they were made, ADL
argued that it was first necessary to acquire an
efficient and effective integrated information
system, which exploited the latest technological
developments.
The grant application began with what seems to be a reply
defending the Department against the critics of the BPD over
the past years. After defining the objectives of police
departments principally in terms of their crime control function,
the discussion turned to the difficulty involved in trying to
measure the success with which these measures are obtained.
For example, ADL made the assertion that "at present (there is)
no way of comparing cost of increased protection with benefits
41
in terms of reduced crime. " Further, until direct causal
relationships between crime and demographic characteristics
could be discovered, the proposal argued, it would be improper
to use the UCR's to compare the relative performance of police
departments.
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After preparing the reader with this discourse on the in-
validity of comparisons between cities, ADL then introduced
some of the comparative, and highly uncomplimentary, statistics
on Boston to which its critics had frequently pointed. More-
over, in connection with each of these statistics, ADL either
suggested a second statistic which presented a more auspicious
aspect of the Department's activities or showed a less dero-
gatory way in which one could interpret the Department's un-
favorable record.
Although the proposal claimed that the comparative statis-
tics were irrelevant, it subsequently conceded that various
groups ihad considered them significant enough so as to want
to discover their cause. The consultant noted that as a re-
sult, there had been numerous studies of the BPD, the most
recent of which had been the 1962 IACP (Quinn Tamm) Survey.
Furthermore, the application identified the Tamm Report, along
with the anticipated installation of the IBM 390/30 computer
and the need to make some decisions about the Department's
communications equipment (which was soon to become obsolete
because of the need to rearrange district boundaries following
urban renewal activities) as the primary pressures forcing the
Department to undergo some reform.
Perhaps more interesting, after arguing that the informa-
tion which one can collect on police operations doesn't accurat-
ely measure the extent to which the Department's fundamental
crime control objectives are achieved, the application stated
that the proposed research would primarily be concerned with
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developing a plan for an integrated information and communi-
cations system. The proposal dealt with this apparent contra-
diction by reasoning that since one can't measure how well
police objectives are achieved or the appropriate level of po-
lice effort for a city, one should do the next best thing, and
maximize police effectiveness per dollar. That is done, the
application continued, by changes in operating procedures and
resource allocations. The proposed information system, ADL
argued, would make it possible to measure the effect of these
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changes. However, one thing which the proposal didn't make
clear was what performance indicators one should use in evalu-
ating police effectiveness given the inability to directly
measure the achievement of basic crime control objectives.
For instance, does one look at the number of police cars on the
street per dollar? Does that information alone tell us enough?
In fact, does it tell us anything about the quality of police
service?
The 1967 proposal also presents the reader with information
about ADL's probable conduct of its research. For one thing,
it became clear that ADL intended from the start to carry out
43its research independently of the BPD. ADL may have structured
its research in this way because it assumed the lack of access
to the client which had characterized the San Francisco study.
Alternatively, this approach may have been agreed to by the
parties in the interest of maintaining an impression of im-
partial research. Regardless of the reasons for this approach,
as we shall see, ADL's tendency to work in isolation from
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police personnel very soon brought it into conflict with the
BPD.
ADL's comments in the application regarding "Continuation"
are also interesting to note considering both the firm's im-
plicit prior agreement with the Department concerning a
follow-up grant, and the amount of time that was ultimately
required for implementation:
It is expected that implementation of the recommenda-
tions with respect to information and communica-
tion systems will have started before the end of
the proposed research project, and that comple-
tion will be effected by personnel of the depart-
ment. Preliminary work relating to the exploita-
tion of EDP can be implemented by a consulting
firm, J.R. Reilly, already engaged to instruct
the department personnel in procedures and pro-
gramming. It is not known at this time what
arrangements may be made to exploit further
suggestions for the use of modern data pro-
cessing methods in police operations or ad-
Ministration. (emphasis added) 44
Summarizing some of the issues discussed above, although
ADL presented a proposal which superficailly appears to re-
present a rational, impartial, "scientific" research design,
upon closer inspection a number of biases in their argumentbecame
evident. The defense of the Department which ADL included
served no purpose but to present an undeserved positive picture
of the BPD, and to ingratiate the consultant with its client.
Nor did the consultant adequately appraise whether there was
reliable evidence which showed that the information which ADL
would give the Department the capacity to collect had any
quantifiable relationship to the quality of police service.
Finally, the application portended the difficulties which the
BPD was to experience as a result of the consultant' s inde-
pendence.
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ADL and BPD: OLEA Grant #153 Final Report
The OLEA approved the Boston grant application in February
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1967. In September 1967, ADL submitted the final report,
which outlined a general plan for implementing an integrated
information system. The report4 egan largely as the earlier
proposal had, with an appraisal of the problem facing the De-
partment. In the opening section of the final report, however,
ADL admitted that there was a strong feeling on the part of
the public that the degree of protection did not appear to
correspond to costs. They also noted that there was a wide-
spread belief that the Department was overloaded with paper-
work and that it needed to get officers currently performing
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clerical skills back in the street.
The biggest difference between the January 1967. applica-
tion and the final report came in connection with the con-
sultant's discussion of the benefits which would be realized
from the proposed integrated information system. Like the
application, the final report advocated improving the Depart-
ment's cost-effectiveness and administrative efficiency. How-
ever, the consultant argued that the strongest justification
of the proposed system came from its value in the control of
personnel:
The elements of police work are manpower, mobility,
and information...The manpower must be recruited,
trained, deployed, and supervised. The men must
be able to move about, on foot, horse, cycle, auto,
or other vehicle. But these elements cannot be
effective without information. Up-to-the-minute
information is needed so the men can be at the
right place when needed, and so that management
can know that the work is being performed. 48
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The report claimed that by implementing the recommendations
for the integrated information system which was about to be
presented, the Department would achieve much greater control
of its field forces. This, it was implied, would allow the
Department to use its resources in a more efficient and effect-
ive way in attaining its primary crime control objectives.
By defining the value of the proposed integrated informa-
tion system largely in terms of managerial control of field
units, ADL had drastically shifted from its earlier position
(in the application) in which it had emphasized the use of
such a system to measure differences in the quality of police
49.
service achieved by changes in operating procedures. Moreover,
the report conceded that the command staff had significantly
less control of its field units then it should properly have:
"It is our judgement that the inability to control the field
operations is the single greatest defect in the (Boston) police
50function."
The shift towards managerial control was also apparent in
the recommendations which followed the opening sections of the
final report. Initially, developing a plan for a new reports
and records system had been the primary focus of the study, at
least from the Department's standpoint. Accordingly, the final
report suggested a number of changes in the existing records
and reports area to cut down on duplication and to free men for
patrol duty. The most potentially promising of these was the
recommendation to eliminate the District Journal:
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The greatest inefficiency in the records
system is the District Journal. An equivalent
of 75 men in the Department are employed in
keeping up these Journals, mostly with in-
formation which appears in other places, pos-
sibly at other times. The Journals are more
than a record of history, however; they are
the means by which the District Station can
know what is happening in its district from
hour to hour. Except for piecing together
a picture from listening to the police
radio net, a very difficult task, there seems
to be no other way for the District to know
what is happening. Therefore, although we
recommend that the Journals should be drop-
ped eventually, we also recommend that this
act be coupled to a promise to provide some-
thing of equal or greater value to the
District. 51
Nevertheless, the single most significant suggestion made
by the consultant was the recommendation to develop a Command
and Control System (CCS) as the focus of the integrated infor-
mation system. In fact, even the execution of the recommendation
to eliminate the District Journals was directly dependent on
implementing the Command and Control System:
The Districts would not have to generate the
synthetic reality represented by the Journals
if they had the information available in the
turret plus a little more. That "little"is very
likely to be exactly what the turret needs to
perform its function more effectively: a status
board describing the recent past.
At present the dispatcher (in the turret) knows
which cars are on assignment, but can tell only at
considerable inconvenience the relative importance
of various car assignments. It is so difficult,
in fact, that few attempts are made to search out
cars on unimportant assignments when an emer-
gency arises and cars are scarce. Further, no
attempt is made to monitor cars to see whether
they are off the air so long as to suggest
danger or dereliction (emphasis added). The
latter information can be pieced together
after the fact, but is not, in spite of its
utility for the supervisory sargeants at the
district level. (emphasis ADL)
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... It is now technically feasible to make a
command and control system which will:
allow the dispatcher to see at a glance the
status of car operations in any District;
allow District supervisory personnel to know
what its cars are doing; provide data on
daily operations in a machine-usable form
for the preparation of daily operational
statistics; provide the basis for a District
control log to be prepared at Headquarters
for transmission to the Districts; and pro-
vide the machine-usable data base for a
name and location index. 52
Although ADL gave significant attention to the way in
which the CCS would be of utility to the districts, the report
explicitly indicated that the real motivation was not to assist
individual district commanders but rather to benefit the command
staff at headquarters:
The heart of the justification (of the
command and control system) is that Head-
quarters, by increasing its capability from
simply assigning to command plus control...,
will have information which will both im-
prove field operations and allow many men
to be released from paper work and returned
to police work. 53
Something which ADL hadn't mentioned in their final report
was the fact that authority for controlling the patrol force
had traditionally been in the hands of the districts, not the
dispatchers, and that the proposed CCS threatened to dramati-
cally modify the existing power structure in the Department.
ADL was not unaware of this fact; indeed, during the same month
in which they submitted the final report, one of the ADL per-
sonnel had circulated a memo outlining the evolution of the
command and control function in the BPD.
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ADL's History of the BPD Command and Control Function
According to the memo, in the 1930 s the. Boston Police
Department had installed a police call box system throughout
the city, the first such system in the country. The call
boxes in each district were wired by underground cable to
the stationhouses. The call box system served three, perhaps
conflicting, functions. First, it was an important supervisory
tool for the districts, who could communicate with the patrol
force via the duty pull or recall light, or through the direct
telephone line from the box to the station house. The system
also gave the patrolman the ability to summon help (via the wagon
pull and telephone). Although citizens did not have access
to the telephone, the call box also had a citizen alarm turnkey
by which they could summon police assistance.
One of the reasons why the stationhouses had served as
the command and control center for the patrol units in the early
1900's was the fact that calls for service were directly routed,
to the district stations rather than to headquarters:
As foot patrol was replaced by car patrol, and
as more of the police cars came equipped with
mobile radios, the focus of police communica-
tions shifted to headquarters, where the base
radio transmitting station was located. Since
fewer and fewer men were on foot patrol each
year, the clerk in the stationhouse found it
necessary to answer requests for police ser-
vice'....by calling headquarters and having
a car dispatched to the incident. Command of
the mobile patrol was still in the hands of
the districts, since they told the dispatcher
to send a car; control of the mobile patrol
was also in the hands of the district, since
the patrolmen reported in (via the call box
telephone) after every assignment.
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Gradually, however, more and more of the
requests for police service were handled
by headquarters; a Central Complaint Room
was set up in order to answer the tele-
phone calls from citizens and pass the
complaints on to a dispatcher. The dis-
trict was completely bypassed. The citizen
alarms for the district still terminated
in the district stationhouses but the dis-
trict clerks just relayed the number and
location of the actuated citizen alarm to
the Central Complaint Room, which sup-
planted the district as the command center.
Although the command function was assumed
by the dispatchers, they had no authority
to command; although the control function
was in the hands of the district personnel,
they had no knowledge of where their
mobile patrolmen were at any given time. 54
This memo appears to have been an attempt by ADL to present
the proposed system in a way that highlightedits benefits to
the districts, who presumably would have been concerned about the
centralizing effect such a system could have. For instance,
considerable attention was devoted in this memo to describing
how the districts would get instant information on car loca-
tion and status via coaxial cable. "In this way," the memo
argued, "the district supervisory personnel are put back in
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the loop, with immediate supervisory information." From sub-
sequent work schedules produced by the consulting firm, however,
in which expansion of the CCS to the districts is listed as
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one of the last tasks to be undertaken, its clear that ADL
considered HQ to be its primary client group. Additionally,
while ADL was trying to sell the system to the districts on
the basis of the information the system would provide them,
there is no obvious evidence that the districts considered the
current lack of such information a problem. Recall that in
the 1967 final report, for instance, the districts had the
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capacity (after the fact) to compile data on service times
and other activities on district cars but did not.
The BPD's Reaction to the 1967 Final Report
Although ADL hoped the final report would appeal to the
districts, their principal concern was how those BPD personnel
charged with monitoring the project would react to it. As
things turned out, ADL had little to worry aboutfor the re-
sponse of the BPD administration was quite favorable.
There seems to be several reasons, for this positive reac-
tion. One of these stems from the publication of the Presi-
dent's Crime Commission report the preceding summer. The in-
fluence of the recommendations of the Crime Commission on the
Department's thinking is evidenced by the fact that Howland had
Steve Rosenberg (who upon graduating from MIT's Operations
Research program was hired by the Department as a civilian
planner in the Planning Division) prepare a comparison of the
recommendations of the President's Commission with those
of ADL. The memo which Rosenberg prepared cited the analysis
in the Science and Technology Task Force Report of ways of re-
ducing response time in order to increase apprehension. Of
the options described -- public callbox, complaint clerks,
computer and related hardware for a command and control center,
automatic car locator system, and 1-man patrol car -- the
command and control system was "found" to be most cost-effective
in terms of seconds of delay saved per dollar allocated. As
it turns out, Richard Larson, who had participated in the
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development of the BPD-ADL application for OLEA Grant #153, was
the author of this analysis, and, according to Rosenberg's memo,
the parameters of the "hypothetical city" were strongly based
on the city of Boston. Thus, the prestigious Crime Commission
had given an extremely favorable endorsement of a system similar
to that proposed by ADL, and had indicated that such a system
would only cost in the neighborhood of $200,000. Moreover, as
Rosenberg noted in his letter to Howland, "Boston is (because of
the ADL study) probably as far advanced in implementing these
particular recommendations of the Crime Commission as any city. 7
This meant that Boston could potentially acquire a great deal of
status if it went ahead and developed the systems recommended by
ADL.
An additional reason for the BPD's favorable reaction
to the ADL report was the fact that the CCS promised to pro-
vide improved supervision of the patrol force. This point was
probably not lost on Project Director (Supt.) Howland, who
had served as liason with the IACP survey team (which of course
had strongly criticized Boston's existing supervisory system),
and who was serving as Chief .of the Bureau of Inspectional
Services (the office charged with monitoring the patrol force
for irregularities in behavior).
These considerations, as well as the fact that the federal
government would be bearing the brunt of the costs, explain
the adinistration's receptiveness to ADL's recommendations.
Nevertheless, despite ADL's attempts in their final report to
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anticipate the criticisms which might be raised in the Depart-
ment as a whole (and to a great extent had succeeded) , indivi-
dual actors in the BPD had objections even at this stage. For
one thing, Rosenberg (who was emerging as Howland's protege)
had disagreed with some of the consultant's recommendations, and
was undoubtedly disturbed that many of his comments on the
draft of the-final report (which ADL presented to the Depart-
ment during the previous summer) had not been responded to in
the final version of the study. In particular, Rosenberg had
opposed the firm's recommendation to postpone the computer
installation contemplated by the Department. ADL argued that
if the Department was going to develop a CCS, the planned com-
puter would have.to be designed specifically to facilitate the
control of operations. ADL envisioned that this design process
would be a complicated task, and in the meantime, it would be
senseless for the department to install and teach its personnel
to operate equipment which would probably be found inadequate
to the new purposes. 5 8
Rosenberg, on the other hand, apparently was more sensitive
to the pragmatic issues facing the Department. First, because
the computer contract which the Department had executed was "can-
cellable at the end ofthe term, or at ninety days notice," he
argued that "no flexibility in planning future systems /would~
be lost by proceeding as planned with the system 360." In
addition, Rosenberg commented that the "political ramifications
of cancellation at this time would probably be disastrous." 5 9
It seems that Kevin White, who was a mayoral candidate at
the time, was very outspoken about the
-82-
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Department's gross inefficiency, one problem which the new
computer was supposed to. help alleviate. Also, during 1967-68
Commissioner McNamara was chairman of the IACP Committee on
Uniform Crime Records which was very "hot" on utilization of
61
computers by police. If McNamara and the Department hierarchy
were as sensitive to attitudes of the police community as they
appeared to be, they would probably want to avoid the loss of
face the Commissioner might suffer in the IACP if the computer
installation was cancelled. Eventually, Rosenberg's arguments
prevailed over ADL's recommendations on this point, and the
computer installation continued as planned.
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
ADL and BPD: Application for OLEA Grant #346
Despite the Department's disagreement with ADL over the
way in which the Department's data processing capability would
be developed, Howland indicated on October 26, 1967 in a letter
to the OLEA transmitting a copy of the final report from Grant
#153, "that the continuance of our association with ADL, as
originally planned, will result in the final solution of a
great many of the problems pointed out in this (ADL's) pre-
liminary study. This (association) will result in the acqui-
sition by the BPD of records and communications operations
that will serve as a model for other urban, municipal police
departments." Three days earlier the BPD and ADL had sub-
mitted an application to continue the work started during grant
#153. In this proposal, the Department requested a grant of
$160,000, $147,640 of which was to go to ADL. The Department
was to contribute $20,000, 95% of which to be in the form of
the salaries of Superintendents Howland and Taylor, and of two
sergeants assigned to the project on a part-time basis from
Records and Communications. It is interesting to find that not
only did the Department plan on fulfilling its contribution thru
the salaries of these officers, but also requested that OLEA
pay the salaries of a number of other officers who would be
working with the project in various capacities.
The application's summary statement gives a concise pic-
ture of the intended focus of this new work:
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The aim of this project is to assist the
Boston Police Department to refine and
implement a number of recommended changes
in its reporting, records, and communica-
tions system, and subsequently to assess
the impact of these changes. A major
portion of the technical work performed will
be to refocus a planned computer facility
from an information retrieval system to a
switching system as well, for the real time
control of field operations. In this mode,
the integrated computer and communications
systems will also generate many of the
departmental records directly, and most of
the statistical data required by the FBI of
potential use to the department. 62
An important feature of this application (and, in fact,
most of the subsequent proposals from ADL) was the consultant's
failure to specify exactly how far along the Department would
be in implementing the final report's recommendation at the end
of the proposed grant period. A close examination of the pro-
posal discloses that although ADL intended to undertake various
activities in each of the areas identified in their 1967 final
report (reports, records, communications, command and control,
and the computer facility), it appears that many of the "major"
tasks would be largely unfinished at project's end. For in-
stance, although several interim changes would be made in the
records and reporting system, design and implementation of a
completely revised system was .to await the completion .of the
CCS. In fact, the application gave attention to each of the
components of what was to be the integrated information system,
but the real emphasis of the proposed work lay with the de-
velopment of the Command and Control System (CCS). Yet, al-
though the proposal indicates that the consultants would be
determining the computer storage, buffering, and switching
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capacity of the proposed system, and would specify the physical
arrangement of the final Command and Control System, the appli-
cation was extremely vague about when this new system would
actually get implemented.
White's Election as Mayor
The success or failure of the ADL effort to introduce new
technology into the BPD was determined to a great extent by
the salesmanship reflected in its proposals and by its methods
of working with the Department. In addition, however, external
actors played a significant role. One such actor was Kevin
White, who became Mayor of Boston in January 1968. White saw
the BPD "...in terms of high absenteeism, long lists of officers
injured on and off duty, an overall lack of efficiency, and
/iespite McNamara' s attempts at reform7 a department totally
set in its ways, resisting change at all costs and interested
primarily in protecting its own." 6 3 Reforming the police depart-
ment, therefore, became one of the goals of his administration.
In White's view, however, McNamara was not the man to carry out
this job.6 4
McNamara had originally been appointed Commissioner in
the spring of 1962 for a term of five years. In 1967, then
Mayor John Collins appointed him to a second five-year term.
According to Boston Magazine, at the time of White's election,
McNamara was considering retirement -- that is, "until he found
out that White had already located a replacement for him" At
that point, "/e7nraged by White's jumping the gun," Mc-
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Namara decided to stick out his five-year term. This was the
beginning of a "cold war" between the BPD and the Mayor that
lasted until the spring of 1972. While he served his second
term as Commissioner, McNamara (who apparently had given up
most of his hopes of reforming the Department by this time) con-
tinued to relinquish much of his authority to his subordinates. 6 5
The remainder of his tenure was characterized by "grudging coop-
eration between the Department and the mayor, and little or no
rapport between the Department and the community." 6 6
ADL and BPD: OLEA Grant #346
Despite these: tensions, when in June of 1968 the BPD re-
ceived word that the OLEA had confirmed their application, White
gave his immediate approval for expenditure of the grant award.
The total award was for $134,450, or roughly $27,000 less
than the initial request. Of this amount, $133,090 was to go
to ADL.
It was after the approval of this second grant request
that greater interaction -- and conflict -- between the BPD
and ADL began. On August 6, 1968, Steve Waldron of the ADL
staff submitted a progress report to Howland which outlined
the BPD-related activities undertaken by his firm since submis-
sion of the application to OLEA. On several occasions during
the spring, despite the lack of a contract, ADL had prepared
quick paper studies and evaluations of va-eious pieces of
communication equipment which the Department had been interested in
purchasing, and had helped in the selection of vendors. However,
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it was not until the grant award was announced that ADL attempt-
ed an evaluation of the new computer system which had been
recently installed.
ADL's appraisal of the system was rather harsh and conveyed
a much more negative image of the Department's administration
than had earlier reports:
Our initial examination of the computer hardware
installed in the police headquarters indicated
that the configuration is likely to be inadequate
for all but the very short run needs of the de-
partment ...... (After talking with IBM and J.R.
Reilly representatives, who had supposedly advised
the department on hardware to buy) ...The con-
clusions we draw from these meetings, from con-
sultations with computer experts at ADL and else-
where, and from study of relevant documents are
as follows:
a. No substantive and systematic examination of
the department's total medium and long range
requirements preceded the specifications of
computer hardware.
b. The new computer will do little more than
duplicate the functions already satisfied
by the IBM 407 accounting machine currently
in use, but the cost to perform these func-
tions will be increased substantially ......
c. On-line access to stolen car information
cannot be furnished 24 hours per day without
substantially impairing flexibility........
d. In its present configuration the machine will
support only one of the police application
programs which IBM reports to be available,
namely a UCR package....... 67
Upon discovering the inadequacy of the installed equipment,
ADL tried to piece together how the choice was made. Its
findings were also quite embarassing for a number of the
involved parties:
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The real reason for the selection of the
particular hardware now installed will
probably never be known, but it is evident
that no one is eager to assume responsi-
bility. J.R. Reilly reports that his firm
had no responsibility for machine selection
or for systems work on which the selection
was based. The IBM representatives involved
in the sale of the machine are no longer in
evidence, and little record of their acti-
vities appears to remain.
However, the limited info that is available
suggests how the decision could have been
reached. IBM and J.R. Reilly and Co. are
convinced that the department is barely
capable of working with the present computer
system, and that anything more would be too
complex to be understood and1 maintained by
the present police-programnmers. IBM reports
that if it had specified a machine with more
capabilities, the department would not have
agreed to lease it. IBM contends that it
sold the department as much as it could sup-
port at the time the sale was made and that
the department would not have been able to
obtain funds to lease additional hardware.
IBM expects to supply more hardware in the
future, including at least another 32k of
memory, and is fully aware that the present
hardware is inadequate for future require-
ments. In the meantime, the department can
learn about computers on the machine it now
has, eliminate its 407 accounting machines,
and enjoy the advantages (whatever they may
be) of a computerized stolen car file.
We question whether these benefits are worth
about one hundred thousand dollars per year... 68
Given the administration's fixation with the "political
ramifications" of the computer, its very possible that in
selecting the equipment the Department really hadn't been con-
cerned with what the computer could do, just so long as they
could say they had one. It is also probably true that the
Department personnel working on the system's specifications had
little formal computer training. This suggests that the De-
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partment was very susceptible to any suggestions which the consul- -
tants might have made.
In the August memo, the ADL staff also announced that its
time horizon, along with its conception of the project task,
had shifted. After a brief review of the benefits which would
accrue to the Department from the completed CCS, ADL revealed
that it "...may not be possible to accomplish it /installation
of the CCS7 within the time of the present project. Consequent-
ly, we will develop a more limited system, in parallel, for
early implementation. The details of this system will be
reported in a memorandum already in progress." 6 9
Thus, in their first formal report to the BPD on the pro-
ject, three months into the twelve-month term of Grant #346,
ADL had begun to hedge on the time horizon for completion of
the system, and indicated that they had made what appears to
be a unilaterial decision to develop, for the time being, only
a limited CCS. What they didn't make absolutely clear at this
point, however, was that this limited CCS was not to be a limit-
ed "production" (operational) system, but instead its use would
primarily be confined to serving as a training tool to famili-
arize the dispatchers with the approximate design and operation
of the CCS. Moreover, ADL's underlying justification for this
incremental approach was that before the final CCS could be
developed, the "bugs" in the basic design and the idiosyncracies
of the users would have to be discovered and modifications made.
It could be argued, however, that it did not make much sense
for ADL to wait until after the basic (prototype) system
was designed and implemented, before soliciting the opinions
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of the future users.
Most important, ADL ended the progress report with an
announcement of the magnitude of Omnibus Crime Control funds
which were potentially available to the BPD, and volunteered
the firm's help to try to get some of it for the Department.
To this point, ALD's reestimation of the time and effort neces-
sary to make the CCS operational seemed innocent enough (al-
though one wonders why the consultant. did not realize the
difficulties of the task earlier, and why it could not be more
specific about work schedules). However, the disclosure of
ADL's interest in future funding possibilities apparently
raised some concern among the McNamara administration about
the expectations of the consultant.
6
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROTOTYPE SYSTEM
The Prototype's Functional Specifications and the Emphasis on
Control
The consultant's draft of the functional specifications
for the limited CCS were submitted to the Department's admini-
stration in two parts, on December 29, 1968, and January 4, 1969.
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This document was significant for several reasons.
First, Working Memorandum EDG-3 (as the draft was titled)
outlined a revised schedule for the CCS project. The proposed
schedule included six phases. Phase One was concerned with
development of the simplified CCS, with the other phases focusing
on expanding the capabilities of the system and the districts'
access to the system. Although no specific dates were included,
this was another indication of the view which ADL held (or was
trying to market to the BPD) that development of the CCS was to
be a long-term project.
Perhaps more important, from reading the Working Memorandum,
one can get the impression that the CCS configuration was not
being developed very systematically, and that decisions
on equipment and other aspects of the design were being made in
a seriously uncoordinated fashion. For example, the principal
staff author of the memo assumed a layout for the proposed command
and control center which failed to correspond with either the
Department's existing dispatching system or the layout suggested
by another member of the ADL staff. 71  This prior layout had
not only already been approved, but it had been used in the
previous months in planning the redesign of the Department's
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telephone network with NET&T. Moreover, as a result of using
this latest layout proposal in making design calculations, the
number of computer terminal displays which the memo said would
be required was less than half of the figure which had been
given to the Department in earlier discussions.
While ADL's priorities and decision-making process
became more discernible during late 1968 and early 1969, its
emphasis on improving management's control of the field force
began to be much more obvious in all aspects of its work for
the BPD. In January of 1969, the consultant released a memo
proposing a radio communications system for each patrol car
which, like the CCS, would probably increase headquarters'
ability to monitor and supervise the performance of the indivi-
72dual patrol cars. The communications system package for
each patrol unit which ADL proposed included mobile and portable
radios (so that the patrolman would have few good reasons to be
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out of touch with the dispatcher), a car locator, a selective
calling system, and a car identification system (to identify
the source of radio transmission).
The selective calling device was a particularly interest-
ing suggestion. This piece of equipment had two functions:
to switch on a light in the patrol car, signifying that the
dispatcher acknowledged the car's desire to communicate and
would call back as soon as radio traffic permitted; and to turn
on the siren and/or overhead light to attract the patrolman's
attention in an emergency if he is out of his car.
What the memo didn't detail was why this second function
would be necessary if the patrolman was supposedly carrying a
portable radio with him at all times. According to several
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sources who were working in the department around this time,
however, the dispatchers had considerable trouble contacting
units. After completing a series of assignments, many of the
patrol units would remain off-the-air, feeling that they de-
served a break, and would not acknowledge the dispatcher's re-
quest that they identify their status. In fact, at times the
only way for the dispatcher to obtain a car to service an in-
cident was to actually describe the nature of the call over
the air, which tied up valuable transmission time. At such
times., if the incident was an emergency or promised excitement,
many of the missing cars would suddenly "come to life." In
suggesting the selective calling device, the consultant was
apparently hoping that the threat of activating their siren
(which is annoyingly loud for the occupants of a patrol car)
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would be an incentive for the patrolmen to stay in closer com-
munication with the dispatcher.
Control-oriented suggestions like the selective calling
device made ADL's objectives evident enough that members of the
Department were again moved to directly comment on the consul-
tant's work. Not surprisingly, the first reaction came from a
lieutenant from the Central Complaint Section. On March 21,1969,
Lt. David Silverman submitted a memo to Superintendent Howland
outlining his general impressions regarding the deficiencies of
the current system of command of the patrol force and the poten-
tial of technological solutions. Silverman began by describing
the problem of the overlap of command authority which ADL
had noted in earlier memoranda. However, Silverman's description
of the existing -command and control system differed somewhat
from the consultant's, most significantly in regard to the
number of parties which exercised authority over the patrol force:
The operational function as it exists today is
divided up threeways with varying degrees of
control exerted over the patrol force. The
primary command of the Boston Police Department
patrol units rests with the Bureau of Field
Services from which car assignments and
changes in the status of vehicles and deploy-
ment is made to cover various contingencies
that arise from time to time. Secondary
controls or straight transmissions of assign-
ment in response to calls from the general
public for police service are supplied by the
turret at the present time. The third level
of command and control exerted over the nor-
mal operations of the department are at the
district level and are occasionally correlated
with the turret operations. 74
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Thus, Silverman saw the overlap of authority as actually in-
volving three parties (Bureau of Field Services dispatchers, dis-
tricts) rather than just the two (dispatchers and districts)
75identified in ADL documents. To partially alleviate the pro-
blem of conflicting authority, Silverman suggested that the
Department remove responsibility for turret operations from the
Bureau of General Services, and locate it instead under the
Bureau of Field Services (previously the Bureau of Field
Operations). However, as the rest of Silverman's memo indi-
cates, this action would probably not go very far in correcting
the problems of control:
The proposed survey (ADL's Working Memorandum)
endeavors to automate a system that...is
splintered and fragmented among three main com-
peting units (by that I mean that each one can
call cars and give them specific duties and
assignments without the knowledge of the other
and often working at cross purposes or both
working on the same type of assignment without
the knowledge of the other)....At the present
time the dispatcher in the turret has no con-
ceivable knowledge as to the location of cars,
who is on the air, where -these cars are, or even
who is in them....(T),he status of the cars keep
changing from minute to minute without inform-
ing the turret. Cars go into and out of service
for any number of valid reasons, and when the
turret inquiries of the district as to where
a certain car is, the response is often -- oh,
I had to combine two cars, or he had to cover
the wagon, or he went homesick and we forgot
to let you know -- and a whole host of other
explanations.
The dispatcher assumes that the cars are clear and
on the air when the officer informs him of this
but often the car is at the other end of the
district.... (a) car may well be around the corner
from a serious emergency or crime taking place
and the dispatcher has no knowledge of this.
Devices of an electronic nature would eliminate
this fault of the present system. 76
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Silverman' s perceptions of the basic problems of the exist-
ing command system were fundamentally the same as those held
by ADL: that authority for command was fragmented and over-
lapping, and that those sharing this authority were unlikely
to know what a particular car was doing at any instant. Both
ADL and Silverman avoided coming out with an explicit recommend-
ation to centralize control of command authority (although
ADL's proposed CCS, as well as putting the turret personnel
under the Bureau of Field Services, would began to do just
that). In regard to the problem of a lack of knowledge of what
the cars were doingboth ADL and Silverman suggested technolo-
gical solutions. What is most interesting, however, is that
'Silverman felt the solution lay not in a CCS, contrary ADL's
claim, but in some of the less sophisticated devices the
consultant had suggested in its memo on a proposed future patrol
car communications system. Specifically, Silverman stated
that "-the failure of the past has been that the turret does not
have locations devices and cannot tell which car is transmitting
at a given time" (emphasis added). Moreover, rather than im-
plementing an expensive automated car locator system, Silver-
man offered that "a master control chart and a simplified-
numbering system for each vehicle could go a long way in im-
proving the efficiency and control capability exerted by the
turret as well as eliminating many false or superfluous trans-
missions that violate the communications network integrity."7 7
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Whether Silverman's sentiments reflected the feelings of
a considerable number of the command staff or not is uncertain.
What is known is that when Rosenberg (who was expanding his-
role in the federal projects in anticipation of Superintendent
Howland's forthcoming retirement in the fall) had a. series of
meetings with ADL in April 1969 to discuss the Working Memoran-
dum, he largely stuck to narrow technical comments on the pro-
78posed functional specifications. These discussions also dis-
tinctly reflected Rosenberg's interest in the control aspects
of the CCS. For example, Rosenberg repeatedly mentioned that
the Department wanted a way (via the CCS) to flag vehicles
that were off the air for more than twenty mi nutes. In these
meetings it was evident that the administration was committed
to proceed with the CCS (although perhaps only because the
federal government was paying for most of it), and was excited
about whatever additional margin of control over the perform-
ance and use of the patrol force which the system would give
headquarters.
ADL and BPD: Application for LEAA Grant NI-69-007
The influence of Silverman and Rosenberg's comments on
the consultant is apparent in the application for another grant
which was submitted to the OLEA a month before the termination
of project #346. Unlike the previous ones which had suggested
research and work on a number of the information system com-
ponents besides the CCS, this application was almost entirely
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devoted to discussion of the prototype system. Moreover,
whereas in the earlier proposals the consultant had taken
pains not to threaten or insult the districts, in the May 1969
application, the consultant insinuated that many of the ways
in which the district commanders employed patrol units were
illegitimate:
Another reason for creating a command and
control system...(is the fact that) there
are many periods when not a single patrol
car is available to be assigned to a new
incident.. .Good records are kept on service
incidents which involve crimes, public
disturbances and so forth. Very sketching
records are kept on such housekeeping acti-
vities as taking cars to be repaired, trans-
porting prisoners and so forth....
The number of housekeeping events exceeds
the number of law and order type incidents.
More importantly, the time spent on the
average housekeeping event is longer than
that spent on the average service incident.
Therefore, the fraction of cars that is un-
available for assignment due to internal
business is often double that which is un-
available due to public-related business.
Unfortunately, this condition is very difficult
to observe both because of the sketchy records
kept and because events are so numerous that
it has been hard to justify the cost of examin-
ing them. A close examination shows that a com-
bination of discipline of the patrol operations
and the substitution of other means to carry
out some of the housekeeping functions would
greatly increase the number of patrol cars
available at any time. 79
The ADL proposal apparently incorpoated Silverman's concern
that the districts' reassignment of patrol units to various
tasks often impaired the Department's ability to respond to
citizen calls for service. But unlike Silverman, (who took
the position that, though such assignments should be better
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coordinated with the dispatcher, they represented valid uses of
the patrol units) ADL inferred that many of their activities
were unnecessary, presented opportunities for derelection of
duty by patrol officers, and represented an unwarranted usurpa-
tion of the dispatcher's control of the patrol force. This
new attitude toward the districts seems to follow from the
emergence of Rosenberg as Howland's successor. According to
a number of sources, Rosenberg was extremely critical of the
districts' autonomy, and of headquarter's inability to effec-
tively supervise the patrol force.
In the May 1969 application, ADL also introduced a new
project schedule. ADL submitted that the development of the
CCS could be viewed as three phases. Phase I was considered
to be the first "brief" study of the department. According to
the consultant, the Department was currently engaged in Phase
II, during which the recommended changes which the consultant
had felt needed more support had been "buttressed by more
work." In addition, during this "phase" ADL claimed that they
had also "created and examined a large number of systems for
information management and the control of field operations."
Work in this area had supposedly gone so well that ADL pro-
fessed, "we have finally come down to the specifications of a
particular system which we believe can be installed in the
very near future. Implementation is well under way...."80
According to the proposal, the objective of Phase IIIof
the project, which the Department would shortly be entering
upon approval of this new grant request, was to create what
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was termed a "preliminary" command and control system for use
in the command center ("the turret") of the BPD. The develop-
ment of the prototype CCS was just the first of a series of
tasks which would be involved in the eventual installation of
the "preliminary" system. Although the time table was left
vague, the indications were that this process would take con- -
siderable time. Moreover, ADL's utilization of the term "pre-
liminary" suggests that theconsultant was also hoping
for additional work with the BPD following the CCS' installa-
tion.
In addition, the application disclosed that ADL had made
the decision to base the full CCS on an IBM 360/40 with 128K
bytes. Because of the bad experience which the department had
had in choosing their existing computer system, ADL
probably felt obligated to justify this unilateral decision
to the BPD. In the proposal, ADL iterated the benefits which
would accrue to the Department by remaining with IBM:
First, the men who operate the present machine
are familiar with the type. More importantly,
a softward package which comes close to per-
forming the desired operations has already been
put together and operated by IBM on similar
machines in San Francisco. In other words, we
are staying with an IBM computer in order to
take advantage of their experience with parti-
cular software and to take advantage of their
support in implementation of the system. 8 1
ADL apparently expected similar support from Sanders, manufac-
turers of the computer terminals the consultant had decided to
use for the CCS:
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The software package in operation in San
Francisco... uses Sanders Associate Dis-
plays. Sanders has a strong interest in
expanding the market for their displays
in non-military areas, and as a consequence
has guaranteed strong support for our pro-
gramming relative to the displays. One of
the primary architects of the Sanders/IBM
system in San Francisco is now employed by
them in Nashua, New Hampshire, and is avail-
able to us, together with other experts in
displays technology. 82
As we've mentioned, the McNamara administration, or at
least those individuals in it who were charged with monitoring
the federal projects, were very excited about the possibilities
offered by the CCS. By the time of this new application, how-
ever, they had become increasingly concerned with ADL's slow
pace. Although the consultant had managed to develop the func-
tional specifications for the prototype during the previous
grant's term, many of the other tasks which ADL was supposed to
perform under the contract for grant #346 were incomplete. The
consultant's progress was especially slow in those tasks not
directly related to the CCS. As in San Francisco, because the
consultant had considered the high technology item its primary
focus, it may have been devoting inadequate resources to the
other facets of the BPD project.
Nevertheless, since the Department did not have the in-house
technical ability, if it wanted the CCS, it would have to go along
with the consultant. Another incentive for the BPD to continue
with ADL, in spite of the consultant's less than exemplary record,
was the fact that the federal government would be paying the
lion' s share of the costs. While the Department was not foot-
ing the bill itself, those members of the McNamara Administra-
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tion charged with monitoring the projects were interested
enough in the system to take steps to hasten its development.
For instance, in their contract with ADL for the new grant,
#NI-69-007, the BPD stipulated that the prototype was to be
installed and evaluated during the upcoming grant period. More-
over the Department specified that all work not completed by
ADL on grant #346 was to be completed during #NI-69-007.8 3
White Versus the BPD
We've previously mentioned that the Department's adoption
of technological systems was in large part a reaction to
criticisms of the Department by external actors. For instance,
the 1962 IACP report had put strong pressures on the newly
formed McNamara administration to attempt sweeping reforms in
the BPD. The administration's efforts at reform during the
early and mid-sixties had been hindered by the lack of support
from city hall, and by the Commissioner's apparent unwillingness
to replace officers who resisted change. As time went on and
the political pressures eased, McNamara began to delegate more
and more responsibility for "carrying the ball" on reform to
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subordinates like Howland. (Howland, of course, was the indi-
vidual who initiated discussions with the OLEA regarding the
development of an integrated information system.) However, in
the first two years of his administration, Mayor Kevin White
launched several investigations into the BPD's operations which
brought renewed pressure on McNamara' s administration to demon-
strate progress in reforming the Department's basic deficiencies.
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Kevin White attributed his 1967 mayoral victory in large
part to the black vote, and developed the Model Cities Program
as a way to repay the black community and to respond to the dis-
orders of the previous summer. As part of the proposed program,
the ci.ty administration devised a police-community relations
plan for the model cities area which concentrated on increasing
minority involvement in the operations of the BPD: Some of
the main points of this plan were:
1. The Model Cities Staff would have the right to set-
standards for police operations in the area.
2. The legislature would be urged to pass emergency
legislation giving the mayor authority to appoint
to permanent status specific number of qualified
patrolmen, officers, and administrators.
3. A Police Advisory Committee composed of area residents
would be set up. It would specifically include some
persons who disagreed with the police.
4. A community institute for police officers would be
established. Courses would be taught by area resi-
dents and attendence would be mandatory.
5. Psychological testing of all policemen for the pur-
poses of identifying authoritarian personalities (de-
fined as those exhibiting suspecious or sadistic
tendencies) would be required.
6. Volunteer citizens' security patrols would be publically
funded and integrated'into regular police work.
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7. Criminal records would be waived as disqualifying
factors in some instances in order to permit se-
lected men to become police officers.
Since many of these proposals represented an usurpation
of the power of the Commissioner and the Command Staff, oppo-
sition from the BPD administration was expected. As things
turned out, however, the most potent opposition was from the
rank and file. When White submitted the model cities proposal
to the city council for approval, the council passed the ordi-
nance on to the Boston Police Patrolman's Association (the
police union) for their approval of provisions relating to
police. The redrafted version which the BPPA returned, and
which was subsequently approved, eliminated those sections
which proposed hiring men with criminal records, waiving civil
service requirements, using psychological tests, hiring neigh-
borhood security patrolmen, and authorizing the Model Cities
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Agency to oversee police operations.
Mayor White's attempts to expand the BPD Cadet Program met
a similar fate as that experienced by the Model Cities ordinance.
White felt that using police cadets for particular chores would
free patrolmen for actual police duties. Furthermore, as a
result of the contract which the recently established police
union had wrested from the city administration in March 1968,
police salaries had dramatically increased across the board,
making the performance of clerical functions by sworn officers
prohibitively expensive. The cadet program could also be used
as a vehicle to increase the recruitment of blacks for the
Boston police force.
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At first, BPPA did not oppose the proposed expansion.
However, when in July 1968, White proposed to hire 100 addi-
tional police cadets to direct traffic (particularly in downtown
Boston), the union came out in full force against the Mayor's
proposal. One observer of this struggle saw several reasons
for this opposition:
First, there was undoubtably an anti-black
animus among significant components of the
Boston police force, and the resistance to
the police cadet program reflected resent-
ment at the recruitment of more blacks.
Second, the traffic assignments in downtown
Boston generally were desirable because the
policeman became familiar with influential
citizens and businessmen. Also, traffic
assignment was viewed as preferable to
walking a beat. 88
Whatever the reasons for their actions, the BPPA was able
to muster enough influence to block the passage of the cadet
program ordinance when it came before the city council.
Despite such setbacks, White continued to work for the re-
form of the police department. In 1969, concerned with the
Department's high cost, citizen dissatisfaction, and indications
of corruption, he formed a Task Force on the Police and in-
structed them to evaluate the Department's operations and come
up with a list of recommendations for improvements. The Task
Force's report paid particular attention to suggestions for
narrowing the police function, upgrading personnel, and improv-
ing the allocation of department resources:
1. Relieve policemen from serving as downtown traffic
officers or as station clerks and replace them with
civilians so that additional manpower can be used in
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the field.
2. Assign personnel according to need, as determined by
crime trends and service calls. This would mean
transferring a number of men from day to night shifts
and from quiet to more active districts.
3. Rotate personnel between shifts and among the various
communities so that no one remains too long in any
one assignment.
4. Increase supervision at all levels by promoting more
sargeants and putting them in marked cars and by plac-
ing a deputy superintendent in charge of groups of
districts.
5. Recruit younger, better educated officers and see
that promotions go to the same type of men rather
than to those with seniority.
6. Increase sensitivity training for all officers so that
a greater understanding of minority problems is de-
veloped.
Though the Commissioner might have ignored (and let the
rank and file oppose) White's earlier suggestions, this report
was a direct attack on his administration. In effect, the Re-
port reissued the criticisms which the IACP had focused on the
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BPD seven years earlier. It was the same as saying that
McNamara's administration had been unable to do a single thing
to significantly improve the Department in McNamara's one and
one-half terms as commissioner. The police were still poorly
trained and deployed. Officers were still engaged in non-
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police tasks which (with the rise in salaries paid to the
Department's sworn personnel) cost the taxpayer unnecessary
dollars. The Department was decentralized and poorly co-
ordinated, and exercised inadequate supervision of the patrol
force. Moreover, the Department was not responsive to the
needs of a significant segment of the population of Boston.
The Annual Report from the Commissioner for 1969 (which
was issued in January 1970) demonstrated that the McNamara
administration had indeed taken the Mayor's Task Force Report
very seriously. For almost every aspdct of its operations
which the Task Force had criticized the Department reported
that some type of reform had taken place? To bring greater
supervisory capability to the patrol operation, twelve addi-
tional marked cars had been purchased and assigned to patrol
sargeants at the district level. The number of active patrol
supervisors had been increased through additional promotion
of patrolmen to sargeants. The thirteen districts were grouped
into six divisions, and a deputy superintendent was appointed
for each one.
Most important, in the BPD's summary of its reform achieve-
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ments, its technological projects figured prominantly. For
instance, the report pointed to the Command and Control System
being developed as one of the ways that the BPD was trying to
improve supervision, as well as reduce response time to emergency
calls. (In fact, the Task Force Report had probably been a
strong factor in the BPD's decision to continue with the proto-
type's development). Moreover, the report mentioned that the
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Department was continuing to seek out innovative programs which
would help the Department exploit technology to better allocate
its resources.
A number of the "reforms" instituted by the McNamara
administration since 1962 had very little substance to them, and
undoubtably were only carried out because the Department was
under pressure to produce an image of innovation. The a.dminis-
tration did pursue more substantial changes in many aspects of
the BPD's operations, but its efforts were rarely forceful.
If any resistance by the Department's aareer officers or city
hall emerged, the proposed reform was usually aborted. The oppo-
sition of city hall to the IACP recommendations, in fact, had
been a prime reason why McNamara had been able to accomplish so
little during his first term. However, the 1969 Task Force Re-
port indicated that White was going to actively seek out many of
the reforms which c ity h all had heretofor opposed. Consequently,
the environment for change seemed much more promising.
White and McNamara were both in agreement on the need to
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civilianize the traffic function, so it is not surprising that
this was picked to be the first of the Task Force's recommenda-
tions that the two would try to implement. Basically, they
proposed to hire fifty civilians to act as traffic directors
in the central business district. White also sought to hire
50 civilians to handle administrative and clerical tasks at
headquarters, a proposal about which McNamara had some reserva-
tions.
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The BPPA's opinion of the proposed changes was very nega-
tive:
Inside clerical jobs and downtown traffic
jobs are cream puff jobs and they (the
patrolmen) don't want to give them up.
Their answer to the call for more cops
fighting crime is to hire more men, not
reassign some men and replace them with
civilian scum. 9 4
As a result of the opposition of the BPPA and a number of
businessmen, the ordinance to civilize the job of traffic
direction was defeated by the city council. White was able,
nevertheless, to persuade the city council to fund his civilian
clerk program. Thus, the BPD annual report was able to state
that fifty civilian clerks had been hired to release uniformed
police officers for duties in the field. However, as had been
New York City's experience when that department tried to civi-
lianize its clerical work, the end result was that headquarters
had "50 clerks, plus 50 cops (which) they were supposed to
replace still inside doing clerical jobs. ,95
Once again, though McNamara believed in the reform being
undertaken (in this case, civilianization of the Department's
clerical function), he seemed to be unwilling to take the
forceful actions necessary to insure its successful implementation.
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If any meaningful changes were to be accomplished, it appeared
that the BPD would need an individual in a position of power
who was more forceful than McNamara. A prime candidate for
such a leadership role was Steven Rosenberg.
Rosenberg Begins to Press ADL
By February 1970, Steve Rosenberg has been appointed as an
administrative assistant to McNamara and as Director of the
Department's Planning and Research Division. Moreover, he had
also been selected to serve as Howland's successor in the role
of Project Director of the federal grants (currently, grant
#NI-69-007). Almost immediately, Rosenberg made it clear that
he was less than fully satisfied with the 'job that -ADL had been
doing. For instance, in a letter to the National Institute of
Law Enforcement which Rosenberg sent on February 4th, he indi-
cated that most of the project areas in which significant pro-
gress had been realized were those which Department personnel
had largely taken the responsibility for developing. According
to the letter, when it became obvious that ADL was persisting
in concentrating its efforts on the prototype's development,
Rosenberg, Howland, and a handful of BPD personnel had taken over
and done the bulk of the work accomplished to this point on the
callbox system, the coaxial cable system, and the field report-
ing system.
Moreover, despite the supposed concentration of effort, ADL
did not have too much more to show in regard to the CCS than they
had the previous summer. One reason for this was some difficul-
ties which
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ADL had encountered with the programming language selected for
the CCS. Although developed by IBM and IBM users, the FASTER
programming package which the consultant had chosen was not
fully documented or widely available. As a result, considerable
time was required to collect the basic data necessary to de-
sign and program the system. However, Rosenberg's letter to
the National Institute conceded that even when one took into
account such unexpected delays, progress on the CCS seemed to
be extraordinarily slow.
The new critical reaction of the Department to ADL's work
required a strong response from the consultant. Thus, in the
final version of "Functional Specifications of a Prototype
Command and Control System for the BPD," which the consultant
sent to the National Institute on February 18th, ADL sought to
justify its slow progress by describing the great complexity of
the system under development, and the subsequent need to exercise
great care and to "provide for orderly and evolutionary progress
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from one well defined phase to another. In their presentation,
the consultants were also careful to reiterate why developing
an initial prototype system was such a crucial and unavoidable
step in this process.
The prime reason for developing a prototype
system first is the very complexity arising
from an imprecise knowledge of realistic man-
machine interactions; lack of previous ex-
perience gained from operation of a similar
system in a similar environment; incomplete
software packages requiring extensive analysis
to determine where, how, or whether to patch
to provide needed features; and the need to
combine the hardware of different vendors.
Another factor to be considered is the level
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of skill required to operate the system
and the caliber of personnel required to
maintain it. 97
In what appears to be a further attempt to calm the BPD's
growing concerns with the CCS project, in the report to the
National Institute, ADL presented a summary of the features
and benefits which the Department could look forward to upon
installation of the full system. The list of benefits which
ADL developed at first appears quite impressive-. However,
scrutiny reveals that about half of the items are either dupli-
cations of benefits previously mentioned, or are features which
will not be realized unless substantial work over the above
98implementing the CCS is undertaken.
In hindsight, it appears that ADL probably could have
done a much better job of allaying the doubts of the BPD if
they had simply indicated a tentative date for installation of
the prototype. In its May 1969 application for OLGA Gran NI-69-
007, the consultant had indicated that "implementation was
well underway." Yet, nine months later, the "Functional Speci-
fications..." presented no evidence which would convince
an otherwise skeptical Department that, in fact, significant
progress had been made since Rosenberg's meetings with the ADL
staf f the previous spring.
As a result of ADL's failure to present what Rosenberg
would consider a satisfactory response to his expressions
of displeasure with the CCS' progress, during the Spring of 1970
the Director of Planning took a number of steps to determine
details of the CCS' status and to minimize any delay in imple-
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menting other projects which might be caused by ADL's slow
pace. For example, Rosenberg phased out ADL's involvement in all
of the Department's projects which were not inseparately tied to
the CCS. He also began to seek out other consultants to perform
a number of tasks ancillary to the CCS (such as developing a geo-
graphic base file and monitoring the reconstruction of the commu-
nications command center) which had originally been considered
part of ADL's purview.
Despite the fact that the consultant had failed to achieve
a number of contract obligations associated with grant NI-69-007
(which had included completion of both the prototype CCS and the
new records and reporting system), the Department decided to go
along with ADL in submitting the May 1970 grant application. How-
ever, Rosenberg's patience with the consultant had grown exceed-
ingly thin. LEAA approval of the latest grant request, which was
for an additional $100,000, was received by the Department in
September, 1970. At that point, however, Rosenberg informed ADL
that, despite the official October 1st startup date on grant 70-
107e, before he would finalize the contract on this latest phase
of the CCS development he wanted to see a much more detailed work
statement from the consultant than had appeared in the application
itself. 9 9
Additionally, during the spring of 1970, Rosenberg pressed
ADL to specify the technical progress which had been achieved
during the latest grant period, as. well as the work which remained
and an expected date of implementation. In the Project Plan which
ADL developed as part of its May 1970 application for further fed-
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eral support of the CCS project, the consultant had responded to
such pressure by providing a list of the various technical
functions which would be accomplished during the upcoming
grant period. However, although this list was one of the most
detailed work schedules which ADL had provided for the Depart-
ment to date, it was still extremely vague about the exact
nature and relative timing of the tasks. ADL
still claimed that "because of the inherent complexity of the
work to be done and because it is not possible to arbitrarily
separate each activity from the others, accurate forecasting
of the work to be completed within a specific time period is
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not possible."
Moreover, the Project Plan gave little insight into the
amount of technical work that had already gone on prior to this
date. The limited information which the Project Plan did con-
tain on the work accomplished by ADL in the previous months
was hardly something which inspired kudos:
In terms of work accomplished to date a major
achievement has been the completion of the
'Functional Specifications of a Prototype
Command and Control System for the BPD'.'.....
(Thisdocument, it should be remembered,
essentially had been completed in January
1969, almost a year and a half earlier).
... .The past few weeks have seen a concentrated
effort to translate the functional specifica-
tions into a viable software oriented toward
specific central processing hardware an display
terminals. (emphasis added) 101
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EXPANSION OF THE BPD'S PROGRAM FOR EXPLOITING TECHNOLOGY
While Rosenberg was demanding more accountability and pro-
ductivity from ADL, Mayor White became embroiled in another
struggle with the BPPA. A major result of this latest dispute
was even greater pressures on the McNamara administration to
use its resources more efficiently. According to Rory Albert:
This issue started with the Hemenway Street
disturbances during the Cambodian turmoil,
when the police interceded and, according
to the New York Times report of May 15, 1970,
"indiscriminately beat people, broke into
apartments, and threw rocks and bottles at
people from the tops of buildings." White
charged the officers with overreacting. Two
months later, at a second disturbance in the
same area, a bank was firebombed and an apart-
ment was set on fire. The police refrained
from even entering the area and White charged
them with underreacting. The BPPA, by now un-
sure of how the cops were supposed to act,
lashed out at White. They accused him of
handcuffing the police and of ordering them
to stay out of the area. White was furious
at the BPPA; and their relationship, which
conceivably could not get any worse, hit a
new low. 102
This "falling out" did not last very long, however. Within
a few weeks, a meeting had been held between the leaders of
the BPPA and White. As a result of this meeting, the BPPA
decided to endorse White's primary campaign for the Democratic
gubernatorial nomination. In return, White indicated that he
would change the officers' work schedule from five days on,
two days off to four days on, two days off. He also indi-
cated that he would see that a "Minimum Manning" Program would
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be instituted by the Department. Under this program 50% plus
one of the cars in each district would man the streets at all
times. Finally, White gave his guarantee to the union that
the Department would continue to use two-man cars exclusively.
The new working schedule, together with the holiday and
sick leave benefits secured by the BPPA, meant a decline in
the total man-hours worked by the force. At the same time,
police costs were rising dramatically, which was also largely
due to salary concessions made to the union. These develop-
ments only added to the problems the Department was experiencing
in trying to cope with the increasing rates of crime and calls-
for-service. Given his operations research background, it is
not surprising that Rosenberg's response to these pressures in
part was to expand the BPD's program for exploiting technology.
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In 1970, some members of the Raytheon Company, like ADL,
had become intarested in 'the idea of attempting to apply ad-
vanced technology to the problems of the public sector, and they
approached the BPD with an offer to develop a car locator system
for the Department. Under the agreement which was reached, the
Department would not be charged for the development costs for
the car locator system as long as it allowed the Raytheon tech-
nicians to use BPD facilities whenever necessary for the design
and test of the prototype, and promised to purchase the completed
system.
However, long before the project was ne'ar completion, an
administrative shake-up occurred in the firm, and the executive
in charge of the car locator project, Ken Kaye, left the
company. In September of 1970, Kaye met with Rosenberg to
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explain his situation, and suggested that if the Department
was still interested, he could put together a consulting group
to explore the feasibility of an automated vehicle monitoring
system (car locator) for the Department. Rosenberg quickly
consented to the proposition. He undoubtedly realized that the
CCS would not be a particularly effective supervisory tool unless
it was tied in with a car locator system. Additionally, based on
his experience thus far, Rosenberg was probably hesitant about
giving the job of developing an AVM system to ADL. Despite the
fact that the Raytheon team under Kaye had not actually produced
anything for the Department, Rosenberg apparently felt that Kaye's
group had acted in a more responsive and accountable fashion than
the Department's other consultants had to this point.
At Rosenberg's urging, Kaye pulled together a small group
of systems people and founded Urban Sciences, Incorporated.
Rosenberg meanwhile had contacted the Governor's Committee, the
LEAA State Planning Agency, and was able to obtain $25,142 for
the AVM requirements study, which began in October 1970 and was
scheduled to last six months.
In the middle 6f this project, however, Rosenberg brought
Kaye to a demonstration of the patrol force simulation model
which Richard Larson had developed for the NYPD.104 Rosenberg
was extremely enthusiastic about the simulation and suggested
that Larson and Kaye join together to develop a BPD-specific
version of the model. Within a very short time, Larson had
become a consultant to Urban Sciences, and Rosenberg had secured
an LEAA grant of $32,888 for the initial work on developing the
BPD simulation.
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While Rosenberg was expanding the BPD's technological pro-
gram into these other areas, he continued to take steps to
guarantee the earliest possible completion of the CCS. For
instance, when Rosenberg approached the Governor's Committee
for the AVM study funding, he also procured a grant of approxi-
mately $25,000 to be used to develop a computerized geographic
base file (GBF) for automatic address verification. As we've-
mentioned, the GBF (which was an essential component of the CCS,
as well as the AVM) was originally to be developed by ADL. How-
ever, because of ADL's slow progress in developing the CCS proto-
type, Rosenberg decided to award the contract to another consul-
tant, Concord Research.
The Planning Director even explored the possibility of
achieving some of the benefits of the CCS through the use of some
less sophisticated equipment. Utilizing the idea suggested by
ADL in their memo on patrol car communications, Rosenberg and
the BPD's Communications division head developed a siren activa-
tor device which was placed in all the Department's marked patrol
units. The device gave- the dispatcher in headquarters the ability
to activate either the overhead lights and/or the siren of
patrol cars which had been off-the-air for a suspiciously long
period of time.
This effort did not fare very well, to say the least.
Within a month. almost all of the devices, which were fastened
under the dashboard of the police cruisers, had been broken.
Although officially the BPD administration claimed that this
situation was due to faulty equipment, the head of the Depart-
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ment's communications division privately admitted that the
men hadn't liked the devices and had "whacked them with their
nightsticks until they broke., 1 0 5 Some of the officers ex-
plained their dislike in terms which suggested that the siren
activatiors had impaired their ability to function effectively;
others, however, indicated that they resented the activators
because of the implications of "big brother," or because it kept
them from taking breaks which they felt they deserved.1 0 6
The BPD Demands More Accountability: LEAA 70-107e
As we have seen, Rosenberg's difficulties with ADL led him
to seek other consultants for work originally intended for ADL,
and to explore alternative technological approaches to achiev-
ing better supervision. Despite such evidence of the Planning
and Research Director's displeasure, ADL's performance had not
seemed to appreciably improve. With the reception of Waldron' s
work statement in January 1971, Rosenberg felt it was necessary
to directly confront ADL's management with his complaints.
The following excerpt is from Rosenberg's letter to ADL's
Contracting Officer:
Enclosed is the "Work Statement" for the
Integrated Information System which was sent
to me on January 15, 1971. I am disappointed
in the lack of detail and lack of definite in-
formation content in the proposal, especially
in view of the fact that it has taken from
early in September until now to prepare the
two pages. (emphasis added)U 7
The memo went on to state that to meet the Governor's Committee's
funding requirements, the BPD needed a variety of information
on the history of the project up to the current date, the de-
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tails of the work to be carried out, a detailed schedule of
work (including listings and descriptions of expected accom-
plishments and timing), a list of the ADL staff members assigned
to the project, and a discussion of the methods to be used to
evaluate progress and results. Although the name of the
Governor's Committee was invoked, it was clear that the in-
formation requested was the same data which Rosenberg himself
was interested in and had been trying to obtain for over a year.
Moreover, unlike the Department's lax attitude during
grant 346 and NI-69-007 toward the completion of the specified
work, the Director of Planning and Research indicated that the
BPD would tolerate no more delays in the accomplishment of
project objectives.
Please be advised that we consider the con-
tract to be a fixed price technical services
contract with fixed performance requirements
as outlined in Article I of the Contract. We
expect that the above noted performance items
will be completed during the contract period
and before processing of final contract pay-
ment.
....I have halted the processing of the con- 108tract pending receipt of a suitable work plan.
Waldron, ADL's project leader, was very disturbed by the
letter which Rosenberg had sent to his firm's Contracting
Officer, one of Waldron's superiors. He contacted Rosenberg
on January 25th, and set up a meeting for the following day
to discuss revisions in the work plan. The next day Waldron
called to indicate that he had to go out of town and re-
scheduled the meeting for 9:30 on the 28th. A half hour
before this meeting was to begin, Rosenberg received a call
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from Waldron's secretary saying that he was sick and would
have to reschedule the meeting for sometime the. following week.
This information is significant in two respects. First,
that it is available at all suggests that Rosenberg's records
were unusually comprehensive. In fact, immediately following
the letter announcing his dissatisfaction with the ADL work
statement, Rosenberg seemed to begin to exercise much greater
care in recording details of his conversations with ADL staff
members. Apparently he felt that at some future date he would
want to have documentation of the consultant's response to the
BPD's demand for more information and more substantive results.
The notes which Rosenberg had kept for January were also signi-
ficant in that it turnedout that the difficulties which
Rosenberg had in contacting and arranging a meeting with ADL'reps
at this time were characteristic of the entire grant period. 1 0 9
On February 1, 1971, the BPD's Research and Planning Divi-
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sion released its Computer andData Processing Plan. The
Plan reflected Rosenberg's impatience with the Department's
dependence on its consultants, and especially on ADL:
Because the Department has not had any
experienced systems people available and
because the Department has had to train
its own programmers, it has used IBM ex-
pertise in setting up the stolen vehicle
application. It has also used the con-
sulting firm of ADL to develop a Command
and Control system. It has taken a
little longer to develop an on-line system
with people who havenot worked as officers
in the field. The use of outside consultants
is expensive (3-10 times the cost of hiring
competent Department personnel) and the know-
ledge gained in the development of these
applications with the use of consultants is
not accumulated to build a continuously in-
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creasing'body of police system knowledge
within the Department to be applied to
future applications. The Department needs
to hire at least one senior data processing
systems analyst and one principal data pro-
cessing systems analyst.
....As the development of the Department's
computer operations takes place and more
and more dependence is placed on the various
computer-related systems in the daily manage-
ment and control of police operations, it be-
comes essential that the Department have its
own high level systems staff....
....Such systems, once developed, cannot be
considered in a permanent state of completion,
but must be constantly improyed, modified, and
updated. Without a high level systems staff
"living with" the problems of these systems on
a day to day basis, it will be impossible to
keep the systems responsive to the changing
needs of the Department. 111
Rosenberg's negative feelings toward ADL had undoubtedly
been heightened by the fact that even in those instances where
he had directly informed ADL's project staff of his displeasure,
he had gotten very little satisfaction from the consultant.
However, in the revised work statement for LEAA Grant 70-1076
which Waldron submitted in mid-February, 1971, ADL seems to
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have made some significant conciliatory gestures-. For example,
despite the BPD's wishes otherwise, since grant #346,ADL had
persisted on viewing the complete redesign of the record and
reporting system as work which would be undertaken following
the development of the CCS (and which would probably require
an additional grant.) In the February 1971 version of the
70-107E work statement, however, this task was presented as
work which would be completed during the current grant term,
regardless of the status of the CCS.
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Another way in which the Work Statement differed from
ADL's previous presentations was that it contained a detailed
description of the remaining steps in the prototype CCS'
development, as well as a specific schedule for their accomplish-
ment over the next six months. This was an important part of the
information which Rosenberg had been seeking so long from ADL.
This development, along with the change in ADL's position on
the records and reporting system, indicates that Rosenberg's
tactic of going directly to the consulting team's superiors had
been effective.
According to ADL's latest estimates in the February Work
Statement, the prototype CCS would be functional by August, 1971.
Just what the prototype CCS would and would not do was carefully
addressed.
The scope of the prototype command and control
system as it will be implemented for the BPD
is as follows. The system will handle up to
three Sanders on-line display terminals. The
terminal operators will be able to enter trans-
action codes and receive the appropriate replies
independently of one another. The transactions
included in the system will store information
about on-going incidents, and up-date that in-
formation. It will also be possible to retrieve
any of the up-dated incidents. In addition, it
will be able to store and retrieve information
regarding the status of vehicles in the field,
and to change that status. The transactions
implemented also include a set of status displays
to be used as a visual dispatching aid for
assigning vehicles in the field. Each status
display contains, in condensed form, a list of
incident and/or vehicle data, as it is currently
contained in the system.
The prototype command and control system is not
intended to be a production system; rather it is
a tool for learning how to implement an on-line
production system.....The prototype system has
not completely addressed the back-up and re-
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start problems, although the decision has
been reached that sophisticated backup is
not essential. Also, the prototype does
not yet log out the data which it contains
into a format which is directly usable for
analysis.1 1 3
Along with the Prototype CCS, as output of this task,
the consultant promised to produce a manual consisting of
(1) detailed flowcharts of the system, (2) listing of each
module used, (3) a description of the process by which one could
assemble, link edit, and execute the program, (4) a descrip-
tion of the commands, and (5) a description of the control load
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and up-date of all files.
Demonstration of the Prototype
The revised work statement which Waldron and his staff
had prepared was apparently not enough to satisfy Rosenberg.
On March 18th, Waldron contacted Rosenberg to inquire when the
contract would be processed. Rosenberg commented that he was
not at all happy with the consultant's performance and was
considering holding up the contract until he saw some evidence
that the Department was "getting its money's worth." At this
point Waldron asserted that much progress had been made and
they were ready to run a demonstration, but Rosenberg replied
that since he had no idea of what was going on, he could not
115schedule a demonstration.
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once again, Rosenberg's "hard line" appears to have been
effective. Within two weeks, he had received a complete pro-
gress report on the CCS from Waldron, who was coming under
increased scrutiny and pressure from the ADL management to get
the contract with the BPD finalized. According to this report,
the prototype system was in a "demonstration state" with one
terminal on-line and with vehicle and incident files available
to the programs. The memo further reported that the project
team was also in the process of completing final drafts of the
system's documentation and operations -manual. Finally, it dis-
closed that much of the core storage which the BPD, upon ADL' s
advice, had been leasing in anticipation of the prototype's
installation would not be necessary, at least for the near
future:
It has turned out that the prototype system
requires only about 50k of core instead of
the 120k or so originally envisioned. With
a little more ingenuity this can be reduced
even further. Consequently, we expect to be
able to operate the system for test without
the necessity to stop batch (processing)
work on the machine.116
The cover sheet of the progress report from Waldron men-
tioned that ADL wanted to put on a demonstration for the De-
partment on April 9, 1971, and that he (Waldron) wanted to
meet with Rosenberg the day before the test to discuss the
project team's results on other tasks, and to work out a
schedule for the next few months. Waldron closed the letter
by saying that he would call Rosenberg within a few days to
check on the latter's availability for these dates.
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The emphasis which ADL's management gave to demonstrating
the system suggests that they felt that once Rosenberg saw the
prototype in an operational state, he would be much more agree-
able to finalizing the contract. However, despite his
superiors' obvious concern over the BPD project's status,Waldron ap-
parently never got back in touch with Rosenberg before the
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suggested demonstration date.
Finally, on May 25, 1971, ADL demonstrated the prototype
system for Rosenberg and two other representatives of the BPD
(Dep. John R. West and Dep. John J. Bonner). During the demon-
stration, several of the ADL programmers which were present
stated that, because there was no contract, they had done no
work on the system for months. Waldron later informed Rosenberg
that ADL's management had indeed ordered all work stopped until
118the contract was signed. However, even though Rosenberg
subsequently learned that some of the project staff had contin-
ued to work despite the lack of a contract, the incident un-
doubtedly helped to reinforce the view that ADL could have had
the prototype completed much sooner than it did.
Growth in the Influence of Urban Sciences
While ADL's relationship with the BPD was rapidly deteri-
orating, the Department was getting results from its other con-
sultants which .Rosenberg found much more acceptable. In July
of 1971, Urban Sciences issued its findings for the AVM study.
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The report examined improvements in the defined CCS which would
be afforded by the incorporation of an AVM system, and con-
cluded that such a system "would be very beneficial to the
operations of the BPD from the officer safety, public protect-
ion, and financial aspects." 1 1 ccordingly, the study recommended
that the Department .actively pursue the analysis, specification,
and selection of an AVM system as quickly as possible.
Because of the care the consultants had taken to keep the
BPD informed of all project developments, and to provide the
Department with full documentation of -its analysis, Rosenberg
was quite pleased with Urban Sciences' performance on the AVM
study. The Planning Director was also generally satisfied with
the progress Urban Sciences had achieved on the patrol force
simulation model being developed for the Department (under a
separate grant, 70-107B, which began.in February, 1971). Con-
sequently, he was quite receptive to Urban Sciences' suggestion
to seek an additional grant to undertake future work in these
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two areas. In fact, Rosenberg suggested two additional tasks
which he was interested in having Kayes firm perform.
As a result, the formal application for "consulting and
systems engineering services" submitted by Urban Sciences in
121September 1971 listed four major project areas. The first
of the proposed projects concentrated on programming changes
which would improve the operation and use of the patrol force
simulation model. The second. task area was essentially concerned
with a study on the "most promising candidate" AVM systems.
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The final two projects, which had been suggested by Rosenberg,
involved an evaluation of the computer applications planned
by the Department (including an assessment of the present
system's ability to accommodate them), and the provision of
project management and technical services for the redesign of
the Dispatch and Communications Center. The last task, of courser
was originally ADL's responsibility.
As had been the case with the earlier BPD grant applica-
tions which the LEAA State Planning Agency for Massachusetts
had to process, Rosenberg was able to get the Governor's
Committee to give almost immediate approval of the proposal,
and for the requested amounts.
Rosenberg and ADL's Final Confrontation
While developing this new round of project grants, Rosenberg
continued pressing ADL, and got some support in this effort
from theDepartment's other consultants. On the 24th of Septem-
ber, the Planning and Research Director sent off an angry letter
to Martin Ernst, one of Waldron's superiors and the individual
from ADL with whom the Department had first dealt:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter to Dr. Stephen
Waldron of ADL which poses certain questions,
the answers to which are necessary in order to
put our Command and Control, records and in-
formation system project back into full swing.
The letter was sent on August 23, 1971. In
view of the fact that I have had no reply to
this letter, I am refering it to your atten-
tion....
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During the period in which Rosenberg had been expecting a reply
from ADL, both Waldron and his secretary had been hospitalized.
Waldron's secretary had contacted the Department to inform
Rosenberg of the situation, but her message wasn't passed on
to the Planning Director until after he received a call from
an upset Waldron in mid-October who explained his absence and
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the fact that he was back at work.
Though in this particular instance the Planning and
Research Director's criticism of ADL's performance had been
unfounded, the incident understandably improved Rosenberg's
position vis-a-vis the consultant. A second factor which
added fuel to Rosenberg's arguments was criticisms of ADL's
method of operation offered by Urban Sciences. These tended
to echo Rosenberg's feelings that....
Considerable amount of software is being
developed by ADL for the proposed Command
and Control system at the Boston Police
Department. Because of the impact of de-
cisions reached during the life of this
study contract upon the work that the
vendor is supplying, it is imperative that
the BPD obtain from ADL further definition
of their proposed system... ..The estimates
made a few years ago which required the de-
partment to upgrade to a 360/40 computer,
add three additional magnetic tape units,
and increase the memory storage requirements
by a factor of four (from 32k bytes to 128k
bytes) all were estimates somewhat predicted
on a terminal software system (FASTER) which
is no longer being used. The Department must
obtain new estimates and justifications for
the present hardware configuration as well as
any future hardware which may now be recommended
by that vendor. An accurate estimate of the date
of installation of the software system would also
be helpful. (emphasis added) 123
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It should be noted at this point that Rosenberg's criti-
cisms were not critiques of the Command and Control System
itself, but of ADL's record in implementing the system. Des-
pite all the difficulties which the Department had experienced
thus far, Rosenberg was still firmly committed to getting the
system up and running. Although the ADL project staff probably
suspected this fact, the emergence of other consultants to whom
the BPD could turn if relations with ADL became intolerable
gave Rosenberg's position additional strength. In fact, about
this time, Rosenberg hinted to the Urban Sciences staff that
he was interested in them taking over the .CCS development
once the system's documentation was received from ADL.
Over the next few months, Rosenberg attempted to exploit
this position of strength to insure that the consultant com-
pleted the project objectives of grant 70-107E. Between Novem-
ber 1971 and March 1972, he sent several memos to ADL review-
ing what work would be required from the consultant before the-
Department would consider that ADL had fulfilled its contract
obligation. The memo's directed that the Reporting System
was to be completely documented, structured and analyzed, and
a detailed implementation plan for installation was to be pre-
pared, including the organization of interim filing procedures
pending establishment of a new central records system. In
connection with the Central Records System component of the
contract, the consultant was to come up with a set of functional
specifications, including flow charting of the records operation
and procedures, a description of the basic files that would be
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maintained, and estimates of file size and access requirements.
For documentation of the CCS phase of the current project,
Rosenberg demanded a series of materials, including a system
description explaining all programs and flow charting, and a
number of copies of users' manuals. In these memos, Rosenberg
also mentioned the trouble which Department personnel were
experiencing with "bomb-outs" of the CCS. The implicit inference
of the memo was that this difficulty was to be corrected before
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approval of the final contract payment would be given.
In reaction to Rosenberg's latest demands, ADL assumed
the offensive. On March 14, 1972, the BPD received a letter
from the ADL Contracting Officer. The overt purpose of the
letter was to propose a series of additional tasks which ADL
could perform on the Prototype Command and Control System.
In the memo, however, ADL stressed that in its own opinion,
it had fulfilled its responsibility to develop the prototype.
Further, the letter indicated that any further work on the CCS
would be deferred until a new contract had been completed.
....Under a contract associated with Grant Number
70-171 (sic), the Prototype System has been im-
plemented and operated for nearly a year. It
was originally intended that' modification which
became evident from test of the Prototype System
would be embodied in the ultimate or production
Command and Control System. At this time there
appears to be need for an interim stage at which
the modifications can be tested in the Prototype
configuration before the complete hardware con-
figuration is implemented.... (emphasis added)
....The objective of the proposed work is to
modify the Prototype Command and Control System
so that it will be simpler to operate and will
better meet the needs of the department for
training and further evaluation....
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. ... The modified Prototype System will include
a restart capability adequate for testing and
training purposes. It will not include the
ultimate capability to read out data to tape....
.... The total proposed program would come to
$11,000. Work would commence immediately upon
receipt of a fully executed contract and would
be completed within four calendar months.
(emphasis added) 125
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Given the history of their relationship, Rosenberg was not
about to go along with ADL's latest proposal. In a strongly
worded letter to Martin Ernst which Rosenberg sent on April
11, 1972, he produced a list of CCS-related problems which he
indicated would have to be remedied before the BPD could begin
to consider ADL's responsibility "to demonstrate an operating
prototype to be completed." Among the problems which Rosenberg
mentioned was the prototype's unreliability and extreme insta-
bility. According to Rosenberg, the prototype system was so
unstable that one could not operate it long enough to make
any meaningful tests. The BPD personnel trying to use the
system were continually plagued by the extremely frustrating
problem of setting up the system by assigning a number of cars
to radio calls using one of the system transactions (commands),
and then having the prototype "bomb-out" as soon as some other
transaction was used. Moreover, whenever the system bombed
out, all previously entered data was lost, making it necessary
to start the time-consuming initialization procedure over
again.
Another problem which was mentioned concerned the incident
completion time. Although ADL had sold the system on the basis
of its usefulness for supervising the patrol force, the proto-
type did not contain a program for recording the incident com-
pletion time, an important piece of data for determining ser-
vice times,and an indicator of possible dereliction.
Finally, Rosenberg reported out that the Department had
problems in operating the system with multiple terminals on-
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line. The BPD staff found that intermittently the entry line
was lost on one of the terminal display tubes when the other
display tube was transmitting, making it impossible for each
"scope" to act independently.
Rosenberg undoubtably realized that the final grant pay-
ment might not be enough of an incentive for ADL to be willing
to do the specified prototype modifications. Therefore, though
he did not agree to the $11,000 contract package, in his re-
sponse to ADL Rosenberg included a second list of activities
which he said could be undertaken in "the next phase of system
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development. "
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ROSENBERG LEAVES THE BPD
ADL apparently was convinced that the BPD's promise of a
contract extension was sincere, and they agreed to Rosenberg's
counterproposal. However, within the month, Rosenberg, the
critical actor in the Department's federally-subsidized pro-
grams, had resigned from the force. In May 1972, to nobody's -
surprise, but to Rosenberg's disappointment, Mayor White dis-
closed that he wasnot going to ask Commissioner McNamara to
serve for another five-year term. With this news, Rosenberg,
who had been one of McNamara's key aides and had occupied a
temporary civil service position which McNamara had created,
announcedhis own resignation. Rosenberg gave two weeks notice,
but because of the sick leave owed to him, his departure from
the force was almost immediate.
With McNamara's and Rosenberg's departure, a power struggle
began in the Department among those higher ranking officers
who were interested inpreserving or improving their positions
in the forthcoming administration. As a result, anything
inseparably associated with the former administration became
tainted, and the ADL project was no exception. A deputy super-
intendent was appointedby the acting commissioner, Superintendent
Taylor, to supervise the remainder of the federally funded pro-
jects, including the LEAA grants, but he had neither Rosenberg's
technical understanding nor the intellectual commitment to util-
izing such sophisticated tools. Given these personal differences
and the uncertain political environment within the Department,
-136-
it is not surprising that the deputy superintendent carried out
his obligations to the ADL project in a passive, caretaking
fashion, rather than acting as an advocate for the project's
implementation.1 2 7
With this change of personnel, ADL, whose contract had
officially ended in June 1971, quickly terminated its relation-
ship with the Department. With the change of administration,
ADL presumably saw that a new contract would be a long time in
coming, if at all. Without such a contract (or Rosenberg to
push them), there was little incentive for the consultant to
complete the modifications. The prototype was turned over to
the BPD with many of theproblems which Rosenberg had mentioned
still in evidence. 1 2 8
Urban Sciences, on the other hand, whose grant term ended
in October 1972, continued with its planned activities.1 2 9
The staff of Urban Sciences apparently were very committed
to the technology they advocated, and devoted themselves to
trying to deliver the best possible product to the Department.
In September, they presented their final reports on the Patrol
Force simulation and the Computer Application Study projects.
The report of the Computer Application Study was signi-
ficant in several respects. First, the report reflected the
consultant's expectation that, with Rosenberg's departure, the
Department's interest in exploiting technology would undoubt-
edly decline, at leasttemporarily. For example, in the report,
Urban Sciences proposed three different computer configura-
tions which the Department could decide among, depending
on its plans. The firstcomputer configuration was based on
the situation that the Department, as Urban Sciences had
recommended, would decide to implement the computer-aided dis-
patching system, an administrative information system, and a
computer-:based central records system. The second configuration
outlined was for the possibility that the Department would
decide not to make a major commitment to design and install a
real-time system as recommended during the next year and a
half. Finally, Urban Sciences presented a third configuration
for the situation should the Department make a decision not to
increase the scope of data processing-for the next several
years. From the presentation, it is evident that the consultant
did not expect the Department to select the first system,
even though that was the option Urban Sciences had recommended.
Further, the computer applications report revealed that
because of its programming errors and the small number of
personnel familiar with its operation, the prototype system
was getting almost no use, and major components of it were
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already considered technologically obsolete.
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THE TOUCHE ROSS & CO. EVALUATION
Even before Urban Sciences submitted its final reports,
however, the McNamara administration's projects were coming
under review. In April 1972, representatives of the Governor's
Committee had decided to attempt to evaluate the BPD's resource
allocation, communications, and information system projects.
Rosenberg was concerned with the possible repercussions such an
evaluation might have, given the poor performance realized on a
number of the projects, most notably the Command and Control
System. Accordingly, it is not surprising that he sought to gain
for the Department some measure of control over what this evalua-
tion would say and who would have access to its findings. In late
April, he sent a memo tothe Executive Director of the Safe
Streets Act Committee, a mayoral advisory group, in which he
asked that the Governor's Committee be reminded that the De-
partment and the City "reserve(d) the full right to approval
of the successful bidder" (i.e., a veto on any unacceptable
bidder). Moreover, he requested that the Governor's Committee
be asked to insert a sentence to the following effect in the
Request for Proposals to perform the evaluation:
No report, oral presentation, publication, or
other presentation of material concerning this
contract is to be made to any person, group,
agency, meeting, or assembly without the ex-
press written permission of the Boston Police
Department.131
These actions suggest that even at- this late date, Rosenberg
was hoping, however unrealistically, that McNamara (and there-
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fore Rosenberg himself) would be retained for another term.
As we have previously indicated, events turned out differently.
It is not altogether obvious why the Governor's Committee
decided to do an evaluation at this point in time. In the re-
port which resulted from the evaluation, four reasons were
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given. First,.all contracts for consulting assistance on the
projects in question had been completed and the required final
reports submitted. Additionally, the report mentioned that the
people responsible for initiation and direction of the projects
-- namely Rosenberg and to a lesser extent McNamara -- had both
left the Department, breaking the continuity of the development.
Moreover, a new Commissioner, Robert J. DiGrazia, had been ap-
poiated by White. Finally, the report claimed that the future
development of these systems would involve the commitment of
substantial additional amounts of money and Department man-
power.
Although. these reasons seemed logical enough in April of
1973 when the final evaluation was submitted to the Governoer's
Committee, most of the events given as rationalizations for
the study had not taken place, and could not be completely
anticipated, in April 1972 when the actual decision to do the
evaluation was made. Instead, what appears to have been a
major motivation for the evaluation was a change in the per-
sonnel on the Governor's Committee staff which shifted the
Committee's stance from one of advocate to one of evaluator.
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Essentially, the person in charge of monitoring and assist-
ing in the technology-oriented grants, who had been so respon-
sive to Rosenberg's requests for funds since 1970, left the
Committee staff in early 1972. His replacement found it ex-
tremely difficult to make sense out of the half-decade of BPD
grants and reports and decided to enlist the aid of an outside
consultant to help in this task 133 In August 1972, Touche
Ross & Co., an accounting firm which had turned to management
analysis and then computer systems analysis, was hired to perform
the evaluation. The great import of this decision resulted from
the influence which the consultant's evaluation would have on the
Governor's Committee's and the new BPD administration's opinion
of the technological projects.
Touche Ross & Co. engaged in a two-stage study of each of the
specified project areas (see Table I) 134 First, the firm made
a calculation of the results in each project area, and compared
them to what the firm determined to be the original stated
goals for the area. To do this, Touche Ross & Co. carried out a
review of written materials and project documentation which
was made available by the Governor's Committee and the BPD.
Second, in order to develop an assessment of the operation-
al impact of the various projects, the Touche Ross & Co. staff
observed the operations of, and interviewed personnel from the
Bureau of Field Operations, the Bureau of Special Operations,
the Bureau of Inspectional Services, and the Bureau of Central
Services. Additionally, the consultant met with representatives
of the Governor's Committee and the Mayor's Office to discuss
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these individuals' perceptions of the federally funded projects.
However, there was no mention in Touche Ross & Co.'s final report
whether the consultant had interviewed, or even tried to inter-
view, either McNamara, Rosenberg, Howland, or the relevant staff
of ADL, Urban Sciences, or Concord Research. In other words,
it appears that Touche Ross & Co. never spoke to the principal
participants in the projects.
Overallthe April 1973 Touche Ross & Co.'s evaluation was
very critical ofthe Department's attempts at technological modern-
ization. In fact, in the Findings Summary of the report, the
consultant stated that, with the exception of the installation
of the new radio dispatch consoles, mobile radios, and portable
radios, the eleven projects evaluated had not achieved their
stated objectives. Further, the consultant emphasized that in
those areas where it felt that project goals had been modified
(such as the Command and Control System), even the "less ambitious"
objectives had not been fully met. 135
Touche Ross & Co. argued that the alleged overall lack of
success could be basically attributed to inadequate leadership by
McNamara and Rosenberg.136 For example, the consultant asserted
that the projects undertaken by the McNamara administration had
emphasized research and use of sophisticated technology rather
than concentrating on opportunities to improve the street opera-
tions (patrol and investigation) of the Department. Moreover,
to be successful and sustain the interest of operations per-
sonnel, Touche Ross & Co.- reasoned,- some' "quick payoff" projects had
to be included in any overall plan of improvement. In the
BPD's case, however, the consultant concluded that projects
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TABLE I
The projects which Touche Ross & Co. examined were:
Project No.
1. Radio Communications System Development: Redesign of
the radio system and purchase of new mobile and port-
able transceivers.
2. Command and Control System Development -- Reconstruc-
tion, design, purchase, and installation of ten new
radio dispatch consoles, thirty-two complaint operator.
positions, and supporting equipment.
3. Command and Control System Development -- Computer Aid-
ed Command and Control System: Development and test
of a prototype computer system to assist police
vehicle dispatch.
4. Command and Control System Development -- Automatic
Vehicle Monitoring System: Determine the feasibility
of an electronic system to locate police cars during
patrol.
5. Bureau of Field Operations Administrative Command
Center: Design andimplement a communications room
for the control of significant field operations.
6. Records and Reporting System Development: Redesign
and implement new paperwork procedures.
7. Resource Allocation System Development: Develop an
automated procedure to establish patrol patterns in
response to changesin the pattern of crime.
8. Statistical System Improvement (Geographic Base File)-:
Implement an automated method to convert street address
into patrol area, district, map coordinates, etc.
9. Computer System Development: Identify and implement
new computer applications.
10. Headquarters to Station Communications System: Inves-
tigate and install new cable to provide data, audio
and video capability.
11. Callbox System: Install free public emergency tele-
phones at key street locations.
(continued on next page)
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Table I Cont'd
This system of categorization of the Department's work was
developed by Touche Ross & Co. In the course of the paper,
we have been primarily concerned with what Touche Ross & Co.
had designated Projects No. 3 and 6, and, to a much lesser
extent, Projects 4, 2, 7 and 9, which together represent the
bulk of the BPD's efforts in the technological area. For each
of these Projects, the Touche Ross & Co. report summarized the
stated goals and objectives, examples of expected operational
improvements and project results, and presented the consul-
tant's recommendations regarding further development.
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with the potential for quick payoffs had been organized in
such a way as to prevent early benefits. Specifically, they
pointed to the case of the records and reporting system where
the elimination of repetitive paperwork had been tied to prior
implementation of the computerized command and control system.
The easier project failed, it was claimed, because the complex
computer-aided dispatching system had failed.
Touche Ross & Co. also claimed that the Commissioner and his
Director of Research had been unable to attach the "confidence
and respect" of career Department personnel even to paperwork
simplification, which was "well known to need improvement."1 3 8
The consultant suggested a number of reasons for this situation:
Career Department personnel had little or no
involvement in the formulation of improvement
projects.
Outside consultants were prohibited from working
closely with Department staff and field personnel
who would use the new systems.
No line commander was made responsible for success-
ful completion of the project.
Few reviews of project progress were held with
command personnel. Command personnel frequently
did not understand the material presented to them
and, feeling that the projects were not their
responsibility, did not attempt to alter project
direction. A general belief existed that the pro-
jects were not relevant to Departmental problems.1 3 9
Touche Ross & Co. maintained that the projects had not been
part of an overall program for improvement for the Department, and
the relative priority of projects was neither established nor
reviewed by the Department command personnel who would be
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affected. Further, because the projects were oriented toward
research and new technology, and because line commanders were
not convinced that the projects were useful, Touche Ross & Co.
argued, no sense of urgency was attached to their completion.
Consequently, "projects were not closely monitored and were
not completed. "
After reading the full text of the April 1973 report and
1141
other relevant materials, however, one could conclude that
many of the statements which Touche Ross & Co. made in the
Findings Summary are inaccurate. For instance, although the
Findings Summary states that with the exception of the installa-
tion of radio equipment ( the Radio Communications System
Development project and part of the Command and Control Center
Reconstruction project) the eleven projects did not meet their
stated objectives, on the basis of the information which the
report itself presents, one might conclude that the
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Automatic Vehicle Monitoring (AVM) project and the BFO Admini-
strative Center project had also been completed according to
142
the Department's specifications. Further research into
source documents suggests that several of the other projects had
met their stated objectives as well.1 4 3
Even in the case of projects which generally everyone
conceded had been unsuccessful, some of Touche Ross & Co.'s
interpretations of events seem to have been mistaken. In dis-
cussing the expected operational improvements of the CCS project,
for instance, the Touche Ross staff asserted that the goals of
the project had changed from "implementation" in 1968 under
OLEA Grant #346 to "demonstration and research" in 1970 and
1441971, under LEAA Grant #70-107e. In'truth, however, the
alleged change in ADL's project goals never actually occurred.
Admittedly, the short term objectives changed from grant to
grant, but throughout all their applications and work statements
ADL had carefully specified that their long range goal was the
implementation of an integrated information system.1 4 5
If Touche Ross & Co.'s evaluation of the eleven project's
was inaccurate or misleading, its analysis of the critical
factors in the project histories was equally so. For example,
the consultant's contention that the federal projects undertaken
by the McNamara Administration were strictly research efforts and
-147-
were never intended to have an effect on improving street opera-
tions is only true in themost narrow sense. The Department's
biggest problems were poor deployment and utilization of resources,
and poor supervision. It seems clear that the technology-oriented
projects represented legitimate (though somewhat indirect) attempts
to correct these problems which limited the patrol force's per-
formance.
Touche Ross & Co. also strongly criticized Rosenberg for pre-
venting the previous consultants from working more closely with
the command staff or field officers. To a certain extent this was
true, but Rosenberg felt such restraint had been justified:
You can't let consultants in out of the blue
and lay this /sales-talk7 on a deputy superin-
tendent or district captain ... .After the first
few words the police officer would be lost and
would stop listening.... And after a couple of
such bad experiences with consultants it would
be impossible to get him /the police officer7
to accept any kind of innovation.... 146
At least in the- case of ADL, however, it was not the Depart-
ment who apparently made the decision that the project team should
operate independently of career offi.cers but the consultant itself.
Similarly, although Touche Ross & Co.'s presentation made it look
as if.'the Department made the decision to have the records and re-
porting system revision follow the completion of the CCS, the reader
will recall that the Department, and Rosenberg especially, tried
repeatedly to get the consultant to perform this work while the
prototype was on-going. In fact, although Touche Ross & Co. put
a lot of stress on making a line commander responsible for project
completion, it was not until Rosenberg became project director
(replacing a line officer, Howland)
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and started putting pressure on ADL, did the consultant produce
more tangible results.
Despitethe numerous apparent inaccuracies, not all of
Touche Ross & Co.'s criticisms of the technological projects
were unwarranted. Many of the projects actually exhibited
serious shortcomings. As we have previously inferred, the final
prototype package which ADL had delivered to the BPD contained
a number of such problems. After running the demonstration
program on the Department's computer, Touche Ross & Co. dis-
covered that the prototype still contained the errors which
caused the system to stop functioning (to "bomb-out"), as well
as design features which made it difficult to simulate the
operation of a production system (which, of course, had been
the stated purpose of the prototype). For example, the system
did not have the ability to store data (such as on car avail-
ability) from run to run. Also, it was not possible to simul-
taneously and separately simulate the complaint operator and
dispatcher functions on the prototype. Moreover, Touche Ross &
Co. pointed out that theconceptual design of the system was
completed almost five years previously, and that since then,
developments in real-time computers and "intelligent" terminals
had made ADL's configuration technically obsolete. 147
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EPILOGUE
In May 1973, DiGrazia's administrative staff presented the
Commissioner with a list of eighteen projects as part of a pro-
posal for an extended program for modernizing the Department.
According to Department spokesmen, the Commissioner then chose
the 'paperwork simplification' and 'resource allocation' pro-
jects as the first of the eighteen to be implemented because
"they had specific boundaries, were clear and readily grasped
both conceptually and technically, and were programs which
148
offered something to the men in the field'."1
Within the month, the DiGrazia administration selected
Touche Ross & Company as the consultant to perform the resource
allocation project. As consultant, Touche Ross & Co. had two
main tasks to carry out. First, the consultant was to document
the assignment of the sworn personnel of the Bureau of Field
Services and to recommend a reorganization of those assignments
in order to provide more officers for street patrol. The second
function which the consultant was to perform was to help the
BPD develop new sector boundaries for its districts (to equal-
ize sector workload), and to design and implement a realloca-
tion of personnel among the districts.
On September 5, 1973, Touche Ross & Co. presented its city-
wide resource allocation implementation plan to the Commissioner,
and on September 18, 1973, the plan was presented to the Depart-
ment command staff. Two days after implementation of the plan
began, however, the BPPA filed a grievance with the municipal
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Office of Labor Relations. The union charged that:
.... by rearranging patrol sectors, DiGrazia's plan
violated the contract because the administration had
changed working conditions without consulting the
Labor-Management Committee of the Association. Fur-
thur, they charged that in one particular district
a number of patrol sectors had been eliminated, and
the size of the remaining patrol areas had been in-
creased. This, they claimed, endangered the health
and safety of those men required to patrol the en-
larged areas.1 4 9
Eventually, the Labor Relations Office ruled that the BPPA
failed to provide sufficient facts to substantiate their accusa-
tions, and the grievance was dismissed for "lack of prosecution".
In the meantime, Touche Ross & Co. continued to assist the Depart-
ment in implementing the reallocation plan. The total city-wide
resource allocation was accomplished in two phases which spanned
a seven month period. The redistribution of personnel for the
first seven districts (1,2,3,4,5,13,14) was completed by September
26, 1973, and the last four districts (6,7,11,15) by March 1974.
When DiGrazia assumed the job of Commissioner of the BPD in
the fall of 1972, an average of 200 calls for help were going
unanswered each eight-hour shift, largely due to the lack of an
.15Qavailable patrol unit to dispatch to the incident. in the Resource
Allocation Project (Phase I) Final Report, however, Touche Ross
& Co. was able to state that over the period of October 1973 -
March 1974, a 26% increase in the number of patrol vehicles
fielded had been achieved, and that the average city-wide 'zero
car availability'1 kad decreased from 25% to 5.9%1.5it should be
noted, however, that these successes were not solely the result
of implementing Touche Ross & Co.'s redistribution plan. For
one thing, in late 1973 the Department began receiving new ship-
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ments of marked vehicles. Another factor which helped the BPD
to alleviate its vehicle shortage problem was the dramatic reduc-
tion in the number of vehicles awaiting repair which was accom-
plished by the Department during the same period.
Moreover, there have been some indications that since March
1974 the zero car availability rate has increased considerably.
Some individuals have suggested that this development is the
result of faulty workload calculations made by Touche Ross & Com-
pany. In their own defense, representatives of the consultant
claim that their efforts were hindered by the unwillingness of the
BPD command staff to make projections regarding probable increases
in crime and service rates. Consequently, in their calculations
Touche Ross & Co. was not able to consider future incident rates
and distributions. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence
that some district commanders have been less than fully coopera-
tive in the effort to reduce zero car availability. The March
1974 final report notes:
Another area of concern was the practice of cer-
tain Districts in fielding, at the beginning of the
tour, its planned number of units, then, shortly after
roll call, releasing certain units to court or other
duties. This practice effectively reduced the level
of actual vehicles fielded while indicating the higher
number (planned) on the vehicle availability sheet.
This practice has been partially controlled by listing
those vehicles, with the times at which they were taken
off the air, on the bottom of the daily zero car avail-
ability reports.153
In addition to its resource allocation and paperwork sim-
plification projects, the DiGrazia administration, like its
predecessor, decided to undertake the development of an com-
puter - assisted dispatching system. During the fall of 1974
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a request for proposals was released. Eleven firms submitted
proposals to the Department. Despite the BPD's previous experi-
ence, from among the eleven firms the DiGrazia administration
selected Arthur D. Little, Inc. to design and implement the
proposed system. In mid-December 1974, ADL and the BPD entered in-
to a $600,000, one-year contract for developing an operational
version of the system.
-153-
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AVM systems "with respect to technical compatibility
with the BPD's CCS, capability to meet required speci-
fications, availability, maintainability, and cost-
effectivity." The proposed cost for this work was
$37,147.00.
C. One of the tasks suggested by Rosenberg was the BPD
Computer Applications Study. This study essentially
involved four parts: (1) a review of the effectivity
of the existingoperations and recommendations on how to
improve them; (2)simplification of the simulation pro-
gram operation (from the user standpoint); (3) a study
of the possibility of advanced uses of the simulation
program; and,(4) a study of the overall effects of exist-
ing and planned projects on the performance and require-
ments of the 360/40 computer, including whether the
360/40 was capable of performing all that was required,
and if not, what were the alternatives, and the recom-
mended solutions, The cost for all this work was es-
timated to be$42,332.00.
D. The fourth task, another which Rosenberg had suggested,
focused on system engineering and project management
of the new Dispatch and Communications Center which
was then being installed at headquarters. The work in-
volved in this task included providing all necessary
engineering consulting and project management of the
system development, installation, and testing phases
of this effort, including collection and preparation of
maintenance routines and records, logistics, and con-
figuration control. The proposed price for this work,
which originally Was to be ADL's responsibility, was
$36,699.00.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
At the beginning of this work, we indicated that though
there was a considerable body of literature devoted to advo-
cating the use of technology by police, little information is
available concerning the process whereby such technology gets
introduced into a department's operations. In particular, we
noted the scarcity of empirical evidence about why departments
actually adopt technology, how they use it, and whether the
actual selection and use of such equipment conforms to theories
about the role of technology in law enforcement. As an initial
step toward discovering answers to these questions, we examined
the introduction of a Command and Control System (similar to
that advocated by the President's Crime Commission) into one
police agency, the Boston Police Department. Comparison of
the BPD case to the assumptions made by the President's Crime
Commission points to a model of technological innovation which
is radically more complex than that anticipated by the Crime
Commission.
Probably one of the most important features of the BPD
experience is that the process by which the Command and Control
System was adopted was stochastic. That is, the.final
character and purpose of the system could not have been pre-
dicted at the start of the process. Over the course of the
introduction and development of the system there were signifi-
cant shifts in the functions which the Department wanted it to
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perform, changes in the actors adopting it, and the equipment
and its goals were modified accordingly. The Crime Commission
had, of course, assumed that a piece of technology served a
single immutable set of goals and that it is adopted as a fixed
"package" to meet these purposes.
A second critical contribution of the Boston experience
was that it demonstrated the inaccuracy of the Crime Commission's
assumptions about the process by which decisions to use tech-
nology are made. In the BPD case, the decision to introduce
the advanced systems was not a choice to accomplish organiza-
tional change through technology. Instead, it was merely a
decision to "acquire" the technology in order to gain the
professional status associated with such equipment. As a
result, there was little initial concern about what the tech-
nology could actually do. Even later, when the purpose of the
Command and Control System shifted, the technology was not
seen as a way to increase the Department's ability to fight
crime. Rather, the McNamara administration hoped to expolit
the system to get more control of the individual patrol units.
Another interesting feature of the BPD's decision-making
process in regard to the technology's adoption was that it was
very compartmentalized. Outside of the few actors directly
involved in the deliberations, everyone else in the command
staff and the rank-and-file was essentially unaware of the
technology's existance and purpose. This fact helps to explain
why the development of the advanced system encountered virtually
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no resistance from the other segments of the Department until
the departure from the Department of the Commissioner and his
Director of Planning and Research.
The BPD case, then, provides us with a number of clues
regarding factors which foster the successful introduction of
technological innovations. Among the most important of these
conditions are:
- an initially aggressive consultant or vendor
- a clear conviction by the department administration
that technology and professionalism are linked
- endorsement of the proposed technology by professional
reference groups
- the combination of a technologically naive sworn
force and an innovator with extensive technical
training
- the availability of external funding
- an innovator who is outside the normal reward struc-
ture of the department and whose success will not
be perceived by members of the command staff as a
threat to their power
- congruence in the technological project staff between
department administrations.
The BPD experience also demonstrated that in some instances
high (very sophisticated) technology will be easier to intro-
duce into a department's operations than low technology.
Finally, the case suggests that, due to its flexibility for
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meeting changing organizational objectives, a department might
realize more success from adopting developing technology than
in implementing a "package" system.
The discussion which follows will consider the effects of
such factors in greater detail. The presentation will be
broken into four parts, focusing on characteristics of the
technology, characteristics of the police organization, ex-
ternal influences, and the principal actors in the federal
projects.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TECHNOLOGY
Expected output of the technology
One of the most interesting findings from the BPD exper-
ience is that, contrary to the Crime Commission's opinion,
the expected output of a piece of technology was often not an
important factor in the Department's deliberations whether to
adopt it or not. In part, this was the case because most
members of McNamara's administration had an insufficient tech-
nical background to understand the workings and implications
of a piece of advanced technology. This meant the Department
lacked the expertise to either rationally select among a set
of technical options or to determine the relative benefits of
technological versus a non-technological approach to a problem.
The inability of the Department to assess the output of
a system had implications for the process of technological
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innovation. First, rather than actively searching for the
optimal technological device to achieve a goal, the Department
was highly dependent on consultants or vendors to suggest
pieces of technology which would presumably help solve a problem --
usually as defined by the consultant/vendor. When Rosenberg
joined the Department, more attention could be paid .to the techni-
cal aspects of the proposed equipment. However, it is signifi-
cant that to a certain extent even Rosenberg was dependent on
consultants to initially suggest the technology (AVM--Raytheon;
Simulation--Larson/Urban Sciences).
Moreover, it is not clear whether the Department's failure
to adopt technical systems by weighing their projected outputs
was solely due to the lack of expertise. In part because of
th-e political pressures on the Department, it was often less
important what a system could do, than that the Department could
say that it was employing "modern technology".
Status and imageability
The status and imageability associated with a piece of
advanced technology turned out to be extremely important consid-
erations in the McNamara administration's decision regarding adop-
tion of equipment. During McNamara's tenure as commissioner, the
Department came under repeated criticism, and there was consider-
able pressure on him to produce an image of change. Yet, many of
the reforms which had been called for were unachievable
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because of local political opposition. Others would have re-
quired McNamara to enter an all-out battle against the districts,
which he apparently was not willing to do. Since he was limited
in the areas in which he could actually carry out reforms, it
was crucial that.the reforms which he did undertake project a
strong image of modernization and professionalism. Through
the adoption of highly imageable sophisticated technology,
McNamara -apparently. hoped to assuage .the. criticisma
aimed at the overall operation of the BPD.
Consequently, in a period characterized by respect for
technology, it was logical for McNamara to introduce a computer
into the BPD's operations. Similarly, it was when the presti-
gious and highly visible Crime Commission recommended that
police agencies develop computer-aided command and control sys-
tems that he approved the ADL proposal to develop the CCS. The
President's Commission's endorsement of the command and control
system concept undoubtedly strengthened the legitimacy of
technology with which McNamara had little familiarity, and linked
it strongly to his image of a professional police department.
Flexibility of design
Although the literature examining technological innova-
tions generally assumes that the technology exists as a
developed "package,"1 a characteristic of much of the advanced
technology introduced into the BPD was that it evolved during
the process of diffusion. In the case of the CCS, this situa-
tion resulted from the relative dearth of comparable efforts
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which might have provided the basic configuration for the
system. As a consequence of wishing to be extremely innova-
tive, the Department and its consultant were required to do
all the fundamental development work themselves. This meant
that the cost of the system was much higher than it would be
for 'late adopters' 2 (who could learn from an innovative
organization's mistakes). Similarly, the time from introduc-
tion to full implementation of the CCS was considerable. In
spite of these difficulties, the CCS experience demonstrated
that the innovative organization has a real advantage over
the late adopter in terms of its ability to mold the technology
to its specific needs. For instance, because the CCS had no
pre-determined structure, Rosenberg was able to modify the
design to serve the latent goal of supervision, as well as
the espoused professional police goal of crime control. (With
projects such as the simulation, which had initially been
designed for New York City, Rosenberg had had much less flex-
ibility in altering the function of the technology.)
Rosenberg and ADL were also able to modify the system to
meet the changing political pressures on the Department, as
well as the shifting sources of criticism within the Depart-
ment, and thus to assure that the system would resist oppo-
sition. In a very real sense, the flexibility created by
developing (rather than buying) a system made it possible for
the CCS continually to appear to serve all the Departments
conflicting goals.
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High verses low technology
While the Crime Commission made no mention of distinc-
tions which departments could expect in the success of intro-
ducing "high" versus "low" technology, one would expect that
the adoption of advanced hardware (such as computer-aided
dispatching systems) would be a more difficult and risky
process than the implementation of much simpler equipment.
The BPD's experience implies, however, that in some instances
the potential for successful implementation of complex techni-
cal systems might actually be greater than that for adopting
much less sophisticated hardware.
There seem to be several explanations for this difference.
First, as was suggested in the prior section, complex systems
often have the capability to at least appear to perform a
greater variety of functions than do more elementary equipment.
Therefore, complex systems can be made to appeal to more
groups.
Second, because of their complexity, few people are likely
to understand the organizational implications of advanced sys-
tems, and therefore the chances of widespread resistance are
decreased. In fact, it is probable that McNamara himself did
not fully appreciate the implications of the CCS when he gave
his original approval for its development. For example, if
McNamara were as unwilling to directly challenge the districts!
power as his earlier actions suggest, he should have rejected
the CCS because of its centralizingpotential and thus, the
confrontations which the system might have provoked.
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Finally, if a sophisticated system is not "naturally"
complex enough to confuse those who might be suspicious of its
purpose, the innovator can add numerous auxiliary functions
to the system's design in order to further conceal its more
controversial aspects. For instance, it appears that Rosenberg
was exploiting this strategy when he "hid" the system's capacity
to identify cars improperly out of service amongst the CCS's
other operations. Similarly, ADL was able to obfuscate the cen-
tralizing function of the CCS so as to avoid opposition by the
districts.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLICE ORGANIZATION
Level of technical expertise
The low level of technical expertise possessed by the BPD
proved to be both a benefit and a hindrance to the effort
to introduce the advanced systems. For instance, because the
rank-and-file did not comprehend the implications of the CCS
for supervision and evaluating performance, no resistance to the
system's development emerged. Similarly, the district commanders
apparently did not fully comprehend that because the CCS would
provide headquarters with a detailed account of the use of
patrol units (and whether such use was compatible with depart-
ment policies) and the workload characteristics of the patrol
divisions, the introduction of the technology would increase the
districts' accountability to the Commissioner and his staff.
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However, the lack of technically trained people also
meant that the Department could be convinced to purchase equip-
ment which was largely useless for its purposes. For instance,
even if McNamara were more concerned with having a computer
than with what such a computer would do, he probably could
have realized this objective at a much lower price than was
paid for the IBM 360/30's leasing. The computer vendor, how-
ever, was convincing enough to "sell" the large machine. Simi-
larly, until Rosenberg was given responsibility for over-seeing
the federal projects, the Department did not have any greater
capacity to effectively monitor consultants' work than they
did to question the claims of vendors. While Howland was
committed to theproject's success, he did not have the back-
ground to properly assess the consultant's claims about the
expected results of their work or their arguments for moving
cautiously in the development of the system.
It would have been expected that Rosenberg and Larson
would give the Department the necessary expertise to deal
critically with technology consultants and vendors. For a
number of reasons, however, they could not assure that the
Department was given the most efficient equipment or the most
effective advice. First, though Rosenberg and Larson were
available to the Department since the beginning of the federal
projects, they had a professional interest in seeing that the
CCS was adopted. Thus, they probably tempered whatever
criticisms they might havemade, for fear that the BPD might
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decide to pursue a less technologically-oriented approach to
its problems. Even after Rosenberg became Project Director
and could deal directly with the consultants, he was similarly
limited in the actions which he could take to expedite the
CCS development. For example, a decision to drop ADL before
something tangible was produced would probably have prompted
a review by the funding bodies, would have impaired the image
McNamara was trying to project, and might have stopped the
development of the CCS.
It is also clear that much more technical staff would
have been necessary, even if the "in-house" experts had been
motivated to advocate the needs of the Department more than
the development of the technology itself. It. is doubtful,
however, whether even a department of BPD' s size would be
willing to support a permanent technical staff large enough
to carry out both the day-to-day data processing work and a
development project on the scale of the CCS. Since there were
so few advocates of technology in the Department, even someone as
powerful as Rosenberg had great difficulty in convincing the
City Council to consider the needs of the data processing
section above those of the other segments of the Department.
Career reward structure
One of the reasons why the Department undertook highly
innovative projects was that the persons charged with exploring
the potential of technology were largely outside of the regular
"reward" structure of the Department. There are a number of
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reasons why the reward structure of police departments generally
discourages innovation. In the academy and on the streets,
police officers are trained to be suspicious of anything devi-
ating from the norm. Because of the desire to control officer
discretion, moreover, the police organization itself places a
high value on predictability and routine performance of duties.
Police departments in this regard certainly fall under a kind
of "Gresham's Law":3 When a person is deeply involved in a
routinized activity, one is not likely to involve oneself in
creative problem solving.
The bureaucratic orientation of the BPD is perhaps more
conservative than even this analysis suggests. There is as
much concern over the internal distribution of power and status
in the Department as there is over the achievement of the
organization's normal goal of crime control. As -a result, the
receptivity to innovation by superiors within the reward struc-
ture (and thus in a position to lose power and prestige) is
low, and any subordinate who suggests a reform which threatens
to bring about major changes will be dealt with harshly. Thus,
even if an innovation were to succeed, it would probably result
in personal failure for its innovator.
As a civilian, Rosenberg was outside the normal career
path and reward structure of the Department. In fact, it is
very significant that his longterm career was dependent on
establishing a reputation as an innovative and successful
operations researcher, not on his success as a member of the
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BPD. Since Rosenberg's goal was to develop a CCS, it becomes
clearer, for instance, why, as the possibility of McNamara's
departure became more real, Rosenberg seemed to put an increas-
ing effort into guaranteeing that the federally funded projects
were completed. Rosenberg was able to pursue these personal
career objectives because they would tend to increase the
power of the individuals in the Department to which he was
most accountable, Howland and McNamara.
Howland was, in contrast, formally part of the Depart-
ments reward structure. His advocacy of innovative projects,
however, can probably be explained by the fact that he was
near the end of his career and had reached the highest rank
in the department (superintendent) which he could possibly
hope to attain. Consequently, the extrinsic rewards of the
Department were less compelling to him than the intrinsic re-
wards of advancing the Department's professionalization, to
which he had a strong commitment. It is also critical that as
head of the Bureau of Inspectional Services, the difficulties
of supervision and control were his concern. Thus, the CCS
promised to provide him both with greater control of the
patrol force and with supervisory status in a "professionalized"
department.
Compartmentalism and visibility
The high imageability of the computer and the CCS as
efforts at reform in large part explain McNamara's willingness
to introduce these advanced technical systems into the BPD.
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However, while these systems were adopted for the general
image they created, their specific goals and design could
not be evident within the department. This "low profile" was
essential because every change in technology carries with it
changes in organizational structure. If these changes are
predictable and are perceived as radical or threatening to
the existing social system, they will, of course, create
resistance by groups within the organization.
Within the BPD, however, the organizational implications
of the CCS were never evident enough to create opposition. In
large part, the CCS had very low visibility because of the
compartmentalism which characterized the BPD's operations.
Like most bureaucracies, the BPD subscribes to the theory of
"monocratic responsibility. " 4 According to this theory, praise
and blame attach to jurisdictions, and career rewards are
conferred or denied according to the successes and failures
which occur within jurisdictions. This results in a strong
personal identification with organizational subunits and in
little attention being paid to the other jurisdictions within
the organization. When work on a multifaceted project is
completed by one subunit, it is handed over to another and
interest in it is dropped. If difficulties occur in the
project thereafter, as long as they don't inseparably concern
the work done by the previous subunits, the prevailing atti-
tude of these groups is that it is "somebody else's problem."
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Whether consciously or not, McNamara took advantage of
this attitude by confining responsibility for the CCS to the
Research&Planning section. Since they were not being evalua-
ted on the basis of the systems' progress, and since the tech-
nology ostensibly would only be affecting the work of the
Central Complaint room and the Planning division itself, the
other segments of the Department paid little heed to the sys-
.tems' development. Thus, the innovation was able to procede
with decision-making power virtually held solely by the Research
and Planning Section, and thus almost without interference.
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
Federal funding
The availability of federal funding played a critical
role in the BPD's program of technological development. It
is commonly held that organizations tend to undertake the most
radical innovations at times of slack, during periods when
the organization has been successful enough to accumulate an
excess of resources.5 What federal funds did for the BPD was
to create an effect which might be termed "localized slack."
That is, it made tremendous resources available to a limited
aspect of the Department's operations. This was important
because it permitted experimentation in areas about which
the Department had not reached a consensus. Moreover, since
the technological projects were not taking resources away from
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any of the other parts of the Department, there was no opposi-
tion from the subunits.
In addition to creating a climate conducive to innovation,
the federal funds also significatly reduced the risk of inno-
vation to the BPD, and especially to those within the Depart-
ment who supported the technology's application. Because the
Department was contributing. so little towards the system's
development, the repercussions of failure would be much less
serious than if the Department was absorbing the full cost.
On the other hand, since the Department had so little at stake
financially, for the first few years of the projects, the
administration seemed to be very lax in demanding timely re-
sults and in approving grant extensions. Consequently, four
years and almost $400,000 were required to produce an error-
filled prototype version of a command and control system, which
the President's Commission had predicted would cost $200,000.6
External evaluation of the BPD
The 1967 President's Commission seemed to feel that the
widespread criticism of the police would spur departments to
make radical organizational changes through new technology.
However, rather than seeking the kinds of fundamental reforms
the Crime Commission had envisioned, the BPD's reaction to
criticism was to attempt to create an image of change, and of
responsiveness to its critics, without substantially upsetting
the status quo of the organization. Thus, a very common res-
ponse of the Department was "more of the same"--more patrol
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cars, more supervisors, more communications gear. It is signi-
ficant that the same spirit seemed to have prompted the Depart-
ment to initiate its program of technological development. In
large part, it appears that the McNamara administration's motiva-
tion for undertaking the CCS project was that such equipment might
be an easily acquired and highly visible symbol of professionali-
zation, rather than that the innovation was expected to result
in significant change in the organization.
It is also interesting that the criticisms to which the
BPD was responding were mostly not directed at its failure to
control crime (as the Crime Commission had assumed) but rather at
its inefficiency. A common deficiency of the IACP, Mayor's Task
Force, and Model Cities reports was the scant, attention paid
to crime statistics. This- fact may reflect a common conviction
that; such data is highly irrelevant and misleading (or perhaps'
a model that the police do have an effect on crime, and the way
to maximize that effect is to maximize efficiency).
As the BPD experience showa, when efficiency is the most
important criterion for evaluating police performance, tech-
nQlogical innovations like the CCS become a logical response.
These systems allow efficiency to be equated with control over
patrol units--an attractive administrative goal. Consequently,
as in BOston's experience, it is likely that much of the tech-
nology ostensibly aimed at increasing crime control will actual-
ly, be. concerned with increasing control of personnel (or
will be redirected by department administrators to serve that
purpose).
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PRINCIPAL ACTORS IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL PROJECTS
Consultants and vendors
In the BPD's experience, the consultants/vendors played
a critical role in bringing the technology to the attention of
the Department. Because of their own organizational pressures,
however, they often "oversold" the equipment. For instance,
as mentioned earlier, because of the BPD's lack of technical
sophistication and its need for a symbol of professionalization,
the computer vendor was able to convince the Department to lease
an expensive computer system which could do little more than the
unit recording equipment already functioning in the data proces-
sing section. Similarly, the assured availability of federal
funds, and the desire to establish themselves as leaders in the
public-sector technical systems field, encouraged the other con-
sultants to urge that the BPD undertake technological projects
which the Department did not fully understand and clearly did
not have the personnel to maintain.
What is most surprising, however, is that despite the
various consultants' interest in establishing a reputation in
police technical systems, they not only oversold equipment, but
they also often failed to perform to the client's satisfaction.
In this regard, the Boston experience suggests that the consul-
tants'/vendors' size may influence its performance. Most of
these firms were relatively large and had numerous contracts,
and therefore, those personnel assigned to'the BPD contract were
also working on a number of other projects. This means it was more
difficult to coordinate the work of different technicians. Moreover,
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since the BPD had a limited ability (before Rosenberg) to assess
the reasonableness of the systems' progress, when the consul-
tants were forced to put increased efforts into their other
projects, they could, if they wanted "coast" on the BPD contract.
The one consultant examined in this study with whom the BPD was
most satisfied was Urban Sciences, and it should be. remembered-
that for a considerable period the Department was its only
client.
Funding sources
We've already noted that the availability of federal subsi-
dies and the funding ratios which favored technological innova-
tion predisposed the Department to engage in the development of
the CCS. Aside from such "passive" influences, however, the
funding sources and their local representatives seemed to have
played a very small role in determining the specific nature of
the Department's technological program. In part, this may have
been due to the fact that Rosenberg functioned as an in-house
expert on technology, and thus, there was less need for the
local LEAA State Planning Agency (The Governor's Committee on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice) to provide guidance
and direction.
Even assuming that Rosenberg's role was a factor, the
Governor's Committee was surprisingly ill-informed about the
project's development, and showed little concern for the pro-
gress realized. For instance, even after ADL had repeatedly
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failed to meet contract objectives, the BPD experienced little
difficulty in getting additional grants. This particular
situation might be explained by the fact that the Planning
Agency had more money than it had projects to fund. In order
to guarantee that the state's share of the LEAA program funds
were not reduced the following year, there was pressure on the
Governor's Committee to distribute all the available funds.
Although the Governor's Committee staff took almost no
part in the day-to-day development of the CCS, it had a con-
siderable impact on the fate ofthe system following Rosenberg's
departure. As we noted in the case study, near the time of
Rosenberg's resignation there was a turnover in the Governor's
Committee staff charged with overseeing the BPD's technological
projects. As a result of the confusing state of the records which
the Committee had kept on theprojects, the new monitor sought
the assistance ofa consultant to prepare an evaluation of the
Department's ,technological systems. The final report from this
evaluation, which apparently contained a number of inaccuracies,
provided the interregnum BPD command staff with a strong justifi-
cation for abandoning a system whose advocate they had resented,
and whose purposes they had not appreciated.
The Commissioner
Although McNamara exhibited little direct involvement
in the advanced systems' development as time went on, his role
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was critical in establishing that the Department's efforts as
creating a professional image would have a largely technolo-
gical orientation. The Commissioner's rationale for adopting
this approach was quite different from the one which the Pres-
ident's Crime Commission advanced, however. Since he assumed
office immediately following a major BPD scandal, and just
before the IACP was to issue what could be expected to be an
uncomplimentary report on the Department, the Commissioner was
under considerable pressure to demonstrate improvements in the
BPD's operations and organization. However, lack of city hall
support prevented him from implementing many of the suggestions
offered by the IACP. In addition, McNamara's law enforcement
background had been with the FBI. As a result, McNamara had
essentially had no direct experience with the management of
police departments, and with the BPD in particular. Consequent-
ly, the Commissioner was undoubtably hesitant about undertaking
any reforms which threatened to precipitate widespread resis-
tance in the Department. Because technology would not be
perceived as threatening by the Department establishment, and
because it was highly imageable, McNamara was very receptive
to IBM's and ADL's proposals regarding sophisticated technical
systems.
The character of McNamara' s relationship with Howland
and Rosenberg was another factor which had important implica-
tions for the BPD's program of technological development.
Because he was so close to Rosenberg and Howland, McNamara
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vested them with considerable power, and acquiesced to many of
their reform proposals. However, in the last year of his
tenure as Commilssioner, McNamara also increasingly relied on
the assistance of these individuals (and especially Rosenberg)
for the day-to-day coordination of the Department's activities.
One consequence of this behavior was that the BPD's ability
to closely monitor the federal projects was seriously impaired.
The innovators
Both Rosenberg and Howland played major roles as inno-
vators in the BPD. In the history of the federal projects,
Rosenberg's presence was especially important. As a profession-
al operations researcher, he naturally turned to that field
for a solution when he perceived a problem in the Department.
Moreover, because of his professional training, Rosenberg
was particularly likely both to perceive problems in the Depart-
ment's operations, and to feel a compulsion to deal with them.
Consequently, whereas Howland was limited to responding to the
suggestions of the consultants regarding technological develop-
ment, Rosenberg could and did initiate projects himself, and
accordingly, the development program expanded greatly under
his stewardship.
In part because of their reform zeal, Howland and Rosen-
berg also had a propensity towards taking on additional re-
sponsibilities in the Department. A consequence of these
additional duties, as we mentioned in the preceding section, was
that their ability to effectively monitor the technological projects
-189-
was impaired. In Howland's case, this situation was especially
critical, for, because of his technical naivete, he was already
very dependent on the good will of the consultants.
As we have seen, however, in the area of technological develop-
ment, the consultants often encouraged the Department to under-
take unrealistic or questionably productive projects.
We've also mentioned that because Rosenberg was a civilian
and outside the normal reward structure, he was more likely to
engage in innovative behavior. Nonetheless, because Rosenberg
had not worked his way up through the ranks, some very powerful
members of the command staff were jealous of his relationship
with McNamara, and of the power which the Commissioner vested
in him. While McNamara was commissioner; Rosenberg was too
powerful for such individuals to openly express their animosity.
However, with McNamara' s and Rosenberg's departure, the resent-
ment became manifest in the adverse attitude toward the techno-
logical projects which Rosenberg had fostered. Since the
career-minded officers in the BPD were very sensitive to such
attitudes, after Rosenberg's resignation, little effort was
put into salvaging the CCS and other advanced systems.
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CONCLUSIONS
One of the basic objectives of this study has been to
begin to assess whether the President's Crime Commission was
realistic in expecting police departments to make the deci-
sion to adopt technology simply because a "professional" body
like itself had urged them to do so. Although there are
obvious problems to drawing conclusions to such questions on
the basis of a single data point, it seems likely that many
aspects of the Boston Police Department's experience could
be generaliable to other large urban police forces. Moreover,
while there have been few comparable case studies to date,
the results of a number of related studies (which have examined
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and computer use
8by police) are available, and can be examined for clues to
the validity of this thesis' conclusions. At the very least,
the Boston experience should provide a set of hypotheses to
be used in future investigations.
The data on the Boston Police Department suggests that,
indeed, the Crime Commission's endorsement of highly sophis-
ticated technology (computers, simulation models, automated
command and control systems, and the like) probably served as
an important motivation for departments to procure such
hardware. In addition, the Boston case shows that the Commis-
sion was correct in anticipating that federal subsidization of
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the equipment would also be a powerful inducement for adopting
the recommended technology. Given the small number of indi-
viduals in the BPD who were seriously committed to applying
the technology, it is clear that the Boston Police Department's
technological program would have been mucn smaller had the
federal funds not been available. A study by Colton (1971)
appears to substantiate our finding regarding the importance
of thefederal grant program. According to Colton' s article,
"Use of Computers by Police: Patterns of Success and Failure,"
over forty percent of those police departmentswho have access
to a computer indicated that they had received LEAA subsidiza-
tion of their electronic data processing operation, and more
than 65% of these forces admitted that their computer facility
9
would have been smaller or non-existant without such help.
While the Crime Commission correctly assessed the impor-
tance of certain factors, it failea to anticipate the BPD's
problems surrounding the development and implementation of
such technological systems. Because of the crude and dis-
organized state of the Department's records system in the mid-
sixties, the task of developing the Command and Control System
not only involved putting together the system configuration
and doing the necessary programming, but also designing a new
data collection system. All this meant that the CCS develop-
ment effort would take more time and effort than had been
originally foreseen. If the Boston experience is at all
representative, one could anticipate (and Colton's report
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again appears to corroborate this)10 that many other departments
attempting to develop advanced systems might have experienced
similar cost and schedule overruns.
In addition to the problems arising from the innate com-
plexity and data base requirements of such systems, the BPD had
the added difficulty of overzealous or uncooperative vendors and
consultants. Because the Department did not have the technical
expertise to effectively evaluate and monitor the work that was
being performed for it, to a great extent it was at the mercy
of the consultants. Since, during the late sixties, most police
departments were presumably as technically naive as the pre-
Rosenberg BPD, from the Boston case study we could expect that
many other departments required .the services of outside experts,
and would be similarly vulnerable to consultant/vendor abuse.
In fact, the United States Congressional Committee on Government
Operations, which investigated the Block Grant Program of the
LEAA in 1972, reportedthat nearly one-fifth of every State Plan-
ning Agency planning dollar had been spent on outside consul-
tants. Moreover, the Committee at that time suggested that there
was a strong possibility that vendor "overselling" and consul-
tant misconduct might be a common phenomenon.1 1
While the Boston command and control system never became
fully operational, the case study provides a number of indica-
tions that, once the equipment is implemented, the
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pattern of police use of such equipment, and its impact on
police organization and operations, may be quite different
from what the Crime Commission expected. For instance, many
departments probably shared the BPD's initial lack of appre-
ciation for the technology's potential, and presumably chose
to adopt theadvanced system more because of the status which
such equipment possessed as a result of the Commission's en-
dorsement than because they had been convinced of the utility
of the technology in controlling crime. Under such circum-
stances, where the technology was merely perceived as a show-
piece rather than as an important tool, the chances that such
hardware will become an integral part of the department's
field operations areslim. As a result, the impact of the
technology on such departments' performance is likely to be
negligible.
On the other hand, there undoubtedly are police depart-
ments whose commitments to the technology is more substantive.
The Boston case study suggests, however, that where such
systems are actually being applied, the police administration
may be more concerned with the managerial control aspects of
such equipment than with its effect on controlling crime.
There seem to be several reasons for this possibility. First,
from the Boston experience it appears that police administrators
are judged by their superiors less on the basis of aggregate
statistics than on the basis of efficiency and instances of
police misconduct. Furthermore, technology such as automated
command and control systems is supposed to affect crime
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through reaucing the dispatch delay component of response
time. However, to date, the relationsnips between reduced
response time, apprehension rates, and deterrence remain
mere speculations. Moreover, if police administrators are
interested in reducing crime rates or increasing arrest
pertormance, there seem to be a number ot more direct and
less complicated ways of accomplishing such enas than by
means of the extremely sophisticatea ana expensive systems
which the Crime Commission recommended.
As a result of these consideratxons, it would not be
surprising to find that many administrators are primarily
interested in the technology's capacity to improve head-
quarter's ability to monitor and control officer behavior.
However, even in connection with the relatively more limited
objective (as compared to crime control) of supervision,
tnere is considerable uncertainty regarding the amount ot
adaitional control which will accrue trom such systems. At
best, such systems will only provide data on where a patrot
unit is ana how long it has been at its various locations.
The administrator still aoesn't know what the officers have
actually been coing. Moreover, even the limited supervisory
capability which is available from such systems can be largely
abrogated through collusion of the patroi force and dispatchers. 2
The abiiity of the rank ana file to circumvent, or even
(as in the case of tne siren activator) to sabotage techno-
logical reforms, points up the fact that behavioral problems
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are often not amenable to technical solutions. More important,
tne emphasis on tecnnological approaches to police reform
often obfuscates many of the basic issues which police admin-
istrators and the public at large should be addressing. As
an Oakiana police sargeant has noted:1 5
The computer . . . is an effort by the police depart-
ment to professionalize from a hardware. approach.
This may be O.K., but the more we concentrate on
hardware, tne more often we move away from the basic
people and judgement issues. The real police problems
don't have technical solutions. Instead, it's the
people who are screwed-up; and we need more people-
to-people type etforts in police departments, such
as improvements in communications, increased moti-
vation, productivity modifications, better inter-
personal relations, etc. In short, instead or
hardware resolutions, we need policy resolutions of
the basic issues of the police force.- The result of
the computer may be to take our mind off what are the
real issues. (emphasis adaed)
The kinds or issues to which the otficer was referring
include such questions as, what should constitute the main
tasks of the police?; how should the police be evaluatea?;
how should the police relate to the community?; who should
control police operations?; and, what form should the
organization and management of police department take? If
the "hardware approach" diverts research efforts away from
these basic issues, and (as it did in the Boston Police
Department), diverts attention from more fundamental reform,
then instead ot being the boom which the crime Commission
contemplated, sophisticated technology might actually end up
seriously impairing the quality of police service.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix A contains the following:
- a chart of the organizational structure of the BPD as of 1961
" "" " " " " " 1963
- " " I" "I " " " " " 1969
-I " l " " WI "" "" ""I 1972
" " " " "I " "I "S " " 1973
" " "W " "S " " "W W W 1974
- a description of the responsibilities of the major subunits
of the Department.
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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The Boston Police Department consists of the following major
units:
Police Commissioner
Authorized by law to control the government, administra-
tion, disposition and discipline of the department to make all
rules and regulations for its efficiency.
POLICE COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE
Consists of the Commissioner's personal staff, and the
following special units:
Staff
Responsible for the operation of the Commissioner's Office,
including receiving the public, receiving and processing all
official departmental correspondence, and such other functions
as assigned by the Police Commissioner.
Special Investigation Unit
Responsible for providing the Commissioner with complete
and accurate information on the maintenance of departmental in-
tegrity and for monitoring the efforts and effectiveness of all
police commanders to combat corruption. Solicits information
relative to illegal activities to determine if corruption is
involved.
Informational Services
Responsible for maintaining an effective liaison with the
news media so the public may be informed of police operations.
Develops and coordinates programs to keep all members of the
department informed on police activities. Plans and coordinates
special events concerning the Police Department and its members.
Supervises the production of a department newspaper, and con-
ducts a speakers' bureau.
Planning and Research Division
Responsible for the development of operational, long-range,
and contingency plans. Works with other staff and line police
units in identifying optimum operations strategies. Also co-
ordinates Federal and State grants.
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Legal Affairs Office
Provides legal advice and guidance to members of the police
force concerning operational decisions such as arrest, warrants,
searches and case prosecution and represents the department in
selected civil litigations.
Labor Relations Office
Represents the Police Commissioner at employee collective
bargaining negotiations, conferences and grievance discussions
and assists the Police Commissioner in development of labor
relations and negotiations policy.
BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
Personnel Division
Develops departmental personnel policy and coordinates pro-
cessing of new personnel including background investigations.
Also prepares payroll and maintains payroll records and per-
sonnel files.
Training Division
Responsible for training and developing standards for re-
cruitment, selection and training. Coordinates departmental
career development programs and develops and presents in ser-
vice and specialized training programs.
Services Division
Responsible for the preparation of the department's budget
and the processing of all bills incurred by the department and
coordinates the acquisition, inventory, maintenance and dis-
position of all department property, equipment and supplies and
custody of all lost, stolen and abandoned property in the cus-
tody of the police.
BUREAU OF INSPECTIONAL SERVICES
Internal Affairs Division
Responsible for the supervision of the departmental dis-
ciplinary process and investigates, or has investigated, in-
cidents of police misconduct.
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Staff Inspection Division
Responsible for the evaluation of departmental performance
toward primary goals, assesses relevance and adequacy of rules
and regulations, recommending changes when necessary.
Intelligence Division
Responsible for keeping the department informed of the acti-
vities of known criminals in the city and coordinating the
gathering and evaluation of information concerning persons or
organizations engated in illegal activity.
BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
Communications Division
Responsible for the operation of departmental communications
system, including radio, teletype and signal service.
Records and Data Processing Divisions
Responsible for the management, maintenance and control
of all incident records, criminal records, arrest records, ac-
tive warrants of arrest and other department records and re-
sponsible for the operation of the departmental processing of
information through data processing systems.
BUREAU OF TRAFFIC SERVICES
Responsible for the direction and control of vehicular
traffic and enforcement of traffic rules and regulations.
BUREAU OF FIELD SERVICES
The city is divided into six major area commands. They
are:
Area A -- District 7 - East Boston
District 15 - Charlestown
Area B -- District 1 - Downtown & North End
Criminal Investigation Division Public
Housing Patrol House of Detention
Area C -- District 4 - South End & Back Bay
District 14 - Brighton & Allston
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Area D -- District 2 -
District 3
Area E -- District 6 -
District 11 -
Area F -- District 5 -
District 13 -
Roxbury
Mattapan
South Boston
Dorchester
Hyde Park, West Roxbury and
Roslindale
Jamaica Plain
Each area commander exercises complete administrative and
field supervision in the area under his direction and control,
being responsible for the actions of all personnel assigned to
his command and for providing all police services to the citizens
in his area.
Community Relations Division
Responsible for the coordination of the departmental
community relations activities.
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